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From the beginning, public choice scholars have examined alternative
democratic processes for making societal decisions. 3 Public choice
theory assumes that each citizen has preferences about alternative social
policies. The fundamental task is to investigate the process used to
combine these individual preferences into a social choice. Arrow's
theorem demonstrates that democratic methods of social decisionmak-
ing fail to meet some conditions that seem desirable for any such
process.
4
A public choice theory approach can be applied to the decision pro-
cesses of courts and administrative agencies. When a court or agency
purports to select one of many possible outcomes by ranking the out-
comes under a set of criteria, the situation parallels the democratic
process. In place of the preferences of individual citizens, rankings
0 The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance and comments of Pro-
fessor Michael Levine of the California Institute of Technology and the University of
Southern California Law Center; Professors Charles Plott, John Ferejohn, Roger Noll, and
James Quirk of the California Institute of Technology; Professor Allan Schwartz of the
University of Southern California Law Center; Professor Steven Matthews of the University
of Illinois; and Jean Spitzer, whose effort on this article's final draft made its production
possible.
t Member, California Bar.
1. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
2. Prior to Kenneth Arrow's seminal work, the literature on the theory of public choice
contained only a "few items." Id. at vii. Today there is enough literature in the area to
justify calling public choice "a separate field." Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, 14 J.
EcON. LITERATURE 395, 395 (1976); see id. at 424-33 (listing over 200 articles and books in
or closely related to social choice field from 1951 to 1976).
3. Arrow focused directly on the problem of whether particular types of processes for
making societal decisions by combining individual preferences meet certain rationality
conditions that serve as attractive constraints for social decisionmaking processes. See K.
ARROW, supra note 1, at 2, 22-33. For discussions of public choice theory accessible to the
layman, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 102-26
(2d ed. 1976); A. SEN. COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
4. See K. ARROW, supra note 1, at 2-3, 59-60; R. MUSGRAVE 9- P. MUSGRAVE, supra note
3, at 104-06; A. SEN, sulra note 3, at 35-46.
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under criteria determine judicial or administrative choices. This article
will use public choice theory to demonstrate that some administrative
decision processes cannot possess all of the qualities that either are
claimed by the agencies involved or are required by law. It also con-
siders the applicability of public choice theory to judicial decision-
making. The existing public choice literature appears to have ne-
glected such an analysis. 5
In the recent case of Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke s the Supreme Court examined procedures that use a set of
criteria to select applicants for admission to medical school. In his
opinion, Justice Powell found the admissions system at issue uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory, but suggested that one such procedure,
still involving race as a criterion, would be constitutional.7 Four mem-
bers of the Court (in an opinion hereafter referred to as the "Brennan
opinion") attacked Justice Powell's suggestions, claiming that his al-
ternative process was not significantly different because it would merely
permit decisionmakers to achieve the same result "in a manner that is
not immediately apparent to the public." Application of public choice
theory to alternative methods for choosing medical school classes can
offer insight into the choice process suggested by Justice Powell and
also demonstrate the usefulness of the theory for analysis of admini-
strative and legal decision processes. Part I of this article uses the
medical school admissions context to explain a particular form of
public choice analysis. It also demonstrates that Justice Powell's pro-
posed admissions process must violate at least one of a specified set of
axiomatic characterizations of that process, and that the most likely
violation directly supports the critique in the "Brennan opinion."
Part II applies public choice analysis to the hearing process used by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to choose a broadcast
licensee from among competing applicants. It demonstrates that the
process is internally inconsistent, and explores interpretations of the ap-
5. In Mueller's 1976 collection of social choice literature there are no sources that
concern themselves primarily with agency and judicial decisionmaking processes. See
Mueller, supra note 2, at 424-33. Although one recent article discusses the possible ap-
plication of public choice analysis to juries, multiple judge courts, and administrative
agencies, Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 563,
592-96 (1977), the article applies existing theory to voting in settings other than legisla-
tures or popular elections. This article focuses on how substantive decision elements in
the form of "criteria" are combined into a choice, rather than on how votes representing
the preferences of individuals are combined into a collective choice.
6. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
7. Id. at 2762-66 (Powell, J., announcing judgment of court).
8. Id. at 2794 (opinion of Brennan, White, Malrshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting).
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parent inconsistency, as an illustration of the consequences of the
analysis for administrative decision processes. Part III considers the
application of public choice analysis to judicial decision processes and
contrasts the implications of the theory in this setting with the con-
clusions previously reached concerning administrative agencies.
I. Internally Inconsistent Multicriteria Choice Processes-
An Explication Focusing on the Bakke Decision
A. Introduction
A multicriteria choice process (MCCP) is a method of choosing a
single alternative from many. Three steps characterize an MCCP. First,
the decisionmaker defines or is given a finite set of relevant criteria.
Second, alternatives are ranked under each of the criteria. Finally, the
rankings are combined to generate a choice.
College, graduate, and professional school admissions can be con-
ducted by using an MCCP. In the Bakke case, Justice Powell put
forward the Harvard College admissions program as "[a]n illuminating
example" of a choice process that includes race as a criterion in a con-
stitutionally permissible way.9 As described in the Powell opinion, the
Harvard program does not assure racial diversity by setting aside a
fixed number of places for minorities, as the University of California
at Davis Medical School had done. Instead, the Harvard program looks
at many criteria to assure diversity in its student body. After Harvard
chooses about one-seventh of a class on the basis of the single criterion
of intellectual potential, "diversity" is the primary concern in selecting
the rest of the class from the large group of remaining applicants who
are academically admissible. 10 The "diversity" judgment is made with
"a number of criteria in mind"" including intellectual potential,
athletic and artistic talent, strength of character, family background,
geographic origin, intended field of study, intended occupation, and
membership in "disadvantaged economic, racial [or] ethnic groups."' 2
The comparative value of a high ranking in any one criterion is
influenced by the prevalence of high rankings in that criterion by
previously admitted applicants;' 3 the goal is to create a diverse class.
9. Id. at 2762.
10. Id. at 2765 app. (opinion of Powell, J.).
11. Id. at 2766 app.
12. Id. at 2765 app. These criteria do not comprise an exhaustive list; they are garnered
from the description of the Harvard program in the appendix to Justice Powell's opinion.
See id. at 2765-66 app.
13. Id. at 2766 app.
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The Harvard program uses an MCCP. A set of criteria are identified,
applicants are ranked under those criteria,1 4 and the rankings combine
to dictate a choice. It also seems clear that, at least in filling the last few
places in the class, the process is designed to choose additional members
one by one from the pool of applicants remaining. 5
B. A Class of Internally Inconsistent MCCPs
This section examines whether an MCCP can conform consistently
to a given set of principles or constraints. The first step in the analysis
is to choose nine "axioms." Each axiom either characterizes the opera-
tion of a wide range of real-world MCCPs or represents a normative
principle that is often imposed on the MCCP. The nine axioms yield
an internally inconsistent MCCP in the sense that it is not possible for
all nine axioms to characterize the MCCP at the same time. 6 Given
an MCCP that satisfies some of the axioms, one knows that the process
must violate at least one of the remaining axioms. By examining the
Harvard program as an MCCP, one gains insight into the dialogue
among the justices in the Bakke case. This discussion of the Harvard
program illustrates the nine axioms in a simple context and serves as a
prelude to more complicated treatment of the axioms in their relation
to administrative and judicial decisionmaking.
1. Axiom 1: The MCCP chooses one alternative from a pool of al-
ternatives.
This axiom requires that a choice process operate by selecting a
single most desirable candidate from the pool of candidates.' 7 Even
14. Although all of the listed criteria are considered with the goal of "diversity" in
mind, diversity apparently does not determine all the rankings under each criterion and
thereby reduce the process to a single criterion choice process. The continued emphasis
on excellence in the description of the Harvard program, see id. at 2766 app., suggests
that applicants with higher intellectual potential or more striking artistic talents would
be preferred, all other aspects being equal, over competing applicants. Thus Harvard
would not choose applicants that were less talented than alternative applicants in order
to obtain a more "diverse" spectrum of abilities in the incoming class. Cf. note 47 infra
(determination of ranking under single criterion may itself be product of MCCP).
15. See 98 S. Ct. at 2766 app. (opinion of Powell, J.). This passage contains an example
that suggests a one-by-one choice process. Although one of the facts in the example is that
the admissions committee has "only a few [remaining] places left to fill," the example is
meant to be a general illustration of how race enters as a factor in the admissions pro-
cess. Id.
16. In the appendices, see pp. 768-78 infra, the roman numeral axioms in text are
translated into a set of arabic-numbered axioms and then a rigorous proof of the incon-
sistency of the axioms is carried out. In Appendix A, see pp. 765-68 infra, the proof is
explained by relating it to previous, well-known results in public choice theory. Appendix
D, see pp. 778-79 infra, lists the roman numeral axioms for convenient reference.
17. See pp. 768-79 infra.
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when more than one candidate is ultimately chosen, as in the selec-
tion of a college or medical school class, this axiom is still satisfied
if the group chosen is increased by successively adding the best can-
didate from the remaining alternatives. In an admissions program,
one-by-one addition usually occurs at least for the candidates chosen
from a "waiting list." Presumably this waiting list represents a sequen-
tial ordering by desirability of the best prospects from the pool of
candidates that have not already been accepted.'
2. Axiom II: There are at least three "potential alternatives," each of
which would be chosen if available and if no better alternative were
a possible choice.
This axiom asserts that the world contains at least three minimally
qualified candidates, but makes no claim respecting the number of
candidates that are actually alternatives in the choice process.' 9 A
minimally qualified candidate is one who would be chosen if there
were no available better candidate. A candidate who is not minimally
qualified will not be chosen even if there are no alternative candidates
available. Axiom II is satisfied in the case of medical schools and
universities that have more minimally qualified candidates than places
to be filled.20
3. Axiom III: The choice process can consider any conceivable "po-
tential alternative," regardless of its particular characteristics.
In the context of an admissions MCCP, this axiom means that any
minimally qualified candidate can be considered for a position in the
class. 21
4. Axiom IV: The MCCP uses no absolute scales or absolute weights
to combine categorical rankings into a choice.
This axiom precludes the use of either absolute scales, which trans-
late rankings within criteria into units of an absolute preference, or
absolute weights, which compare and combine the size of preferences
18. The University of California at Davis Medical School used such a waiting list. See
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2740 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
19. See p. 769 infra.
20. The Harvard program defines the central admissions "dilemma" as that of "choos-
ing among a large number of 'qualified' candidates." 98 S. Ct. at 2765 app. (opinion of
Powell, J.). "Qualified'" apparently means "'admissible'" and able to do "adequate
work at Harvard." Id.
21. See p. 769 infra.
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under different criteria.2 2 When absolute scales or absolute weights
are used, the MCCP may combine rankings under various criteria into
a ranking under a single criterion that is decisive. For example, a
medical school admissions process that selects a class by a formula that
combines Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT) score, college
grade-point average, and numerical scores recorded by interviewers into
a single numerical score violates axiom IV.
A choice process may, without violating axiom IV, involve the use
of scaled or quantitative comparisons between applicants within a
single criterion. "Quarternary" comparisons, such as "with respect to
criterion one, A is preferred to B twice as strongly as C is preferred to
D" are acceptable under axiom IV. Only the use of some absolute
method of comparison between criteria violates the axiom.
The use of absolute weights or absolute scales need not be in the
form of a comprehensive and explicit quantitative formula in order
to violate axiom IV. Admissions officers might combine criteria by
unstated, informal rules of thumb. They might, for example, recognize
membership in racially or economically disadvantaged groups by add-
ing standard numbers of points to a candidate's MCAT scores. In
effect, two criteria would be measured on the same absolute scale of
MCAT points.
5. Axiom V: Given any two alternatives A and B, A will be a more
desirable alternative than B, or B will be a more desirable alterna-
tive than A, or A and B will be equally desirable alternatives. The
more desirable of the two must be chosen if one is more desirable
than the other.
The first part of this axiom is technically described as the existence
of a "complete binary relation."2 3 The choice process must be able to
compare alternatives in pairs. Although some pairs of alternatives may
be equally desirable, a complete binary relation exists unless there are
pairs that cannot be compared at all.24 The second part of the axiom
simply constrains the decisionmaker to choose the more desirable of
two unequal alternatives.
An admissions program would probably claim to abide by axiom V.
Admissions officers are unlikely to confess an inability to form prefer-
ences, including indifference, between candidates and they would
22. See pp. 769-70 infra.
23. See pp. 770-71 infra.
24. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 3 (indifference between pairs of candidates is to be
distinguished from inability to compare pairs of candidates at all; only latter indicates
absence of "complete binary relation").
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recognize that selection of the less desirable candidate of a pair would
be irrational.
6. Axiom VI: No one criterion totally dominates the MCCP.
A criterion totally dominates an MCCP if, for all possible pairs of
candidates, the candidate who ranks higher under a particular criterion
will be chosen regardless of the rankings under other criteria that sup-
posedly enter into the choice process. If axiom VI is violated, rankings
under a single criterion determine the choice between any pair of
candidates. 25
As long as a single criterion would not be decisive in every possible
case, axiom VI will not be violated. The axiom can still apply if the
choice within certain categories of candidates is made on the basis of
a single criterion. For example, admitting a medical school class strictly
on the basis of MCATs would involve using a single criterion choice
process, but choosing between white applicants from high-income back-
grounds solely on the basis of MCATs, while using multiple criteria
to choose candidates for admission from other groups, would not in-
volve such a process.
7. Axiom VII: For any set of alternatives, the choice process will have
the same result whether the choice is made directly from the entire
set or is made from a set of preliminary winners chosen from sub-
sets comprising the entire set.
This principle means that "agenda" influences will not affect the
outcome of the MCCP.2 6 Suppose, for example, that three candidates
are being considered for admission to college and that the admissions
committee operates under the rule that one candidate will be preferred
to another if the first candidate ranks higher under two out of three
criteria used in the MCCP.2 7 Suppose, in addition, that the committee
chooses a candidate by successively comparing pairs of candidates-the
"winner" of each pairwise comparison is compared against a candidate
from among those who have not yet been considered. If candidates dis-
play certain rankings under the three criteria, the agenda alone will
25. See p. 771 infra.
26. See id.
27. This example is often used to illustrate that decision by majority vote will not
necessarily be consistent from one occasion to the next even though the same issue is
voted on and the voters have the same preferences. See, e.g., K. ARROW, supra note 1, at
2-3; R. MUSCRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 3, at 106. This "voting paradox" is altered
for the purposes of this article by replacing voters with criteria.
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determine the winner. Suppose the candidates are A, B, and C and
that the rankings under the three criteria are as follows:
Ranking Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3
Best A B C
Middle B C A
Worst C A B
Any of the three candidates can be chosen, depending on which pair of
candidates is compared first:
Winner of
First Pair First Pair Second Pair Overall Winner
A versus B A A versus C C
B versus C B B versus A A
A versus C C C versus B B
An admissions process that operated in this fashion would violate
axiom VII because in some situations the agenda would influence the
choice between candidates.28
It is unlikely that admissions committees have analyzed possible
agenda influences in their selection processes. It seems safe to assume
that, if asked, most committees would agTee that agenda influences
should not have any effect on the choice between candidates. A con-
trary assertion would admit that substantive criteria do not alone de-
termine which candidate will be chosen.
8. Axiom VIII: For every possible set of alternatives, if one member
of the set ranks higher than a second member in every criterion
used in the choice process, then the second member will not be
chosen.
Axiom VIII precludes the choice of an alternative that is inferior to
28. This type of admissions process can also violate other axioms. Suppose the rank-
ings of four candidates under three criteria are as follows:
Ranking Criterion I Criterion 2 Criterion 3
First Y X W
Second X W Z
Third W Z Y
Fourth Z Y X
Suppose that in the first pairwise comparison W is compared to X; X would emerge the
winner of that comparison. Suppose that X is then compared to Y; Y would be the
winner of that comparison, but Z would emerge as the choice after being compared with
Y in the final pairwise comparison. Z, however, is inferior to V under every criterion. A
choice process that selects a candidate when there is another candidate superior under
every criterion violates axiom VIII. See pp. 724-25 infra.
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another alternative under every criterion. 29 Admissions MCCPs com-
bine desirable applicant characteristics into a choice. If two candidates
are equal under all criteria but one, then the candidate that is superior
under the remaining criterion would be more desirable. Hence, if
candidate A is superior to candidate B under every criterion, A is a
more desirable candidate than B. Rationality requires that B not be
chosen when a totally superior candidate, A, is available. All admis-
sions committees would claim, if asked, that this axiom characterizes
their MCCP.
9. Axiom IX: For any two alternatives, A and B, construct their com-
parative categorical rankings. If there are any other two alterna-
tives, C and D, where C has the same comparative rankings relative
to D as A has to B, and D is not chosen over C, then B is not chosen
over A.
Axiom IX requires that switching a candidate's social security num-
ber and other irrelevant characteristics not alter the choice.30 Most
admissions officers would claim that this axiom characterizes their own
choice process, i.e., that supposedly irrelevant criteria do not influence
the choice between candidates.31
C. The Analytic Use of the Internal Inconsistency Result
The appendices contain a proof of a "possibility theorem" 32 estab-
lishing that an MCCP cannot simultaneously satisfy all nine axioms.33.
The possibility theorem aids in the analysis of MCCPs in three ways.
First, the law may require that an MCCP satisfy all nine axioms or
institutions may claim that one does so. An awareness of the possibility
29. See p. 772 infra.
The analysis of MCCPs in this article focuses on a single step in which one candidate is
chosen. Axiom VIII precludes the choice of candidate B when another candidate, A, is
superior to B tinder every criterion. If A is chosen in one step, in the next step B could
be chosen without violating axiom VIII, because A would no longer be in the pool of
candidates. See pp. 720-21 supra.
30. See p. 772 infra.
31. The examination here focuses on the admissions process at a particular period in
time, such as one year. It is clear that criteria change complexion or are added over time.
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2765-66 app. (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) ("concept of diversity" expanded recently in Harvard program to make it
desirable that each class contain nontrivial numbers of students from "disadvantaged
economic, racial and ethnic groups"). It is assumed for purposes of determining the
applicability of axiom IX that the criteria and their significance in the admissions process
remain fixed oer the period when a particular class is chosen.
32. Even though the theorem demonstrates that it is impossible for certain processes
to satisfy certain axioms simultaneously, it is of a t)pe that is referred to as "possibility
theorems." See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37-40; Mueller, supra note 2, at 420.
33. See pp. 720-25 supra (discussing axioms); note 16 supra (summarizing appendices).
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theorem allows one to say for certain that at least one of the claims or
legal requirements is not satisfied by the MCCP.
34
Second, some of the axioms are more likely to be violated than
others.3 5 By examining the probability that each particular axiom is
violated, some idea about the ways in which the MCCP under examina-
tion departs from institutional claims or legal requirements can be
formed. For example, if it is known that a particular process satisfies
axioms I-VIII, one knows that axiom IX is violated and can conclude
that identical cases may not be decided the same way,36 or that in-
fluences not captured by the criteria are affecting the outcome.
37 If
axioms I-V and VII-IX are satisfied, one knows that axiom VI is
violated and choices are determined by the outcome under a single
criterion.38
Finally, when an MCCP claims to satisfy all nine axioms, the possi-
bility theorem is useful in analyzing proposed reforms. Reforms that
do not propose an acceptable violation of at least one axiom will leave
the process in a form that is unable to satisfy at least one institutional
claim or legal requirement. However, if the MCCP can use absolute
weights or rely on a single criterion, in violation of axioms IV30 or VI 40
respectively, then the process will not be internally inconsistent under
the possibility theorem.4
1
D. Application of the Analysis to the Bakke Case
The possibility theorem42 can be applied in two ways to the choice
processes discussed in Bakke. First, the theorem can help illuminate the
probable operation of some of the admissions programs discussed in
the case. Second, the theorem can offer insight into the substance of
the debate within the Court about the constitutionality of various ad-
missions processes.
34. The possibility theorem holds only that at least one of the nine axioms must be
violated. Any particular MCCP may violate more than one axiom.
35. For example, when an axiom is a legal requirement and it is easy to detect a viola-
tion of the axiom, the axiom is not likely to be violated. On the other hand, the violation
of some axioms may be virtually impossible to detect and therefore may be more likely.
See pp. 745-48 infra.
36. See note 31 supra (MCCPs can change over time; axiom IX focuses on one point
in time).
37. See p. 725 supra.
38. See p. 723 supra.
39. See pp. 721-22 supra.
40. See p. 723 supra.
41. The process may still be internally inconsistent for entirely separate reasons.
42. See pp. 720-25 supra.
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1. Analyzing the Harvard Program Under the Nine Axioms
Eight of the nine axioms seem to apply to the Harvard program. In
at least part of the admissions process, the program seems to employ an
MCCP43 that satisfies axiom I by making a series of choices of single
applicants from the pool of remaining applicants."4 Because there are
at least three minimally qualified potential applicants when each
choice is made, axiom II is satisfied.45 Because the admissions process
places no apparent restrictions on the characteristics of applicants,
axiom III appears to be satisfied.40 Since no single criterion dominates
the selection of the last six-sevenths of the class, at least that part of the
admissions process satisfies axiom VI.47 Axioms V, VII, VIII, and IX
all are either highly plausible or highly desirable characteristics of an
admissions process: the process will be able to decide that it either
favors one of two candidates or is indifferent between them and a more
desirable candidate will be chosen over one who is less desirable; the
"agenda" will not influence the outcome; a candidate will not be
chosen if there is another candidate available for the same slot who is
superior to the first candidate under every criterion; and "irrelevant"
criteria will have no effect.48
Of the nine axioms, axiom IV is the only one that is neither ex-
plicitly imposed by the Harvard program nor a plausible or desirable
characteristic of the admissions process. The material cited in the
Powell opinion does not say that the program uses some kind of ab-
solute scales or absolute weights to combine individual ratings under
each criterion into a choice.4 9 Because the Harvard program probably
satisfies the other eight axioms,50 however, axiom IV is probably
43. For a description of the Harvard program as an MCCP, see pp. 719-20 supra.
44. See pp. 720-21 supra.
45. See p. 721 supra.
46. Id.
47. See p. 723 supra.
According to the description of the Harvard program in Bakke, roughly one-seventh of
the class is chosen on the basis of "intellectual potential" alone. 98 S. Ct. at 2765 app.
(opinion of Powell, J.). Determining the outcomes for the single criterion of intellectual
potential, however, may itself involve an MCCP. If it does, then the elements of that
MCCP combined with the elements of the MCCP used to choose the remaining six-
sevenths of the class comprise a composite MCCP that is used to determine the choice of
the entire class.
48. See pp. 722-25 suPra.
49. See 98 S. Ct. at 2762-66 app.
It can therefore be assumed, for present purposes, that Justice Powell was referring to a
process in which there are no absolute scales or absolute weights.
50. This statement must be qualified in three respects. First, it is arguable that Harvard
selects the last six-sevenths of the class based on the single criterion of "diversity," in
violation of axiom VI. But see note 14 supra ("diversity" not single criterion in Harvard
program).
The second qualification goes to the question of whether Harvard uses a finite number
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violated. In choosing each additional member of a class, with knowl-
edge of the characteristics of those already admitted, the admissions
committee must use a system that establishes the relative importance
of the various criteria. This system need not be an explicit quantitative
method of combining information on performance under each crite-
rion; it may consist of unstated rules of thumb.51
2. Harvard's Treatment of Race as a Criterion
The description of the Harvard program states that in order for
Harvard to offer "first-rate education to its students, minority repre-
sentation in the undergraduate [student] body cannot be ignored." '
It goes on to say that "there is some relationship between numbers
[of blacks] and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse
student body."' Furthermore, "10 or 20 black students could not begin
to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points of
view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States."54
Yet the description states that there are no "target-quotas for the num-
ber of blacks" set in the admissions process.55 In the conclusion of the
statement one is given a hypothetical example of a choice between three
applicants to "help to illustrate the kind of significance attached to
race." 56 The lesson of the hypothetical is meant to be that "the critical
criteria are often individual qualities or experience not dependent
upon race but sometimes associated with it.''57
of criteria in its decision process. If the choice criteria are infinite in number or unspeci-
fied even as rough categories, then the admissions process is not a true MCCP. See pp. 719-
20 supra. The description of the Harvard program, however, states that the admissions
committee proceeds "with a number of criteria in mind." 98 S. Ct. at 2766 app. (opinion
of Powell, J.). That statement suggests a choice process based on a finite number of
criteria. In addition, many of the criteria considered seem well-defined but broad enough
to choose a multifaceted college class. See p. 719 supra (listing criteria). Unfortunately,
the description does not provide enough information for one to determine whether there
is a finite set of criteria. See 98 S. Ct. at 2762-66 app. (opinion of Powell, J.).
A final qualification involves the question of whether the Harvard program satisfies
axiom I. There is evidence that at least part of the process operates as a one-by-one choice
of members of the class. See p. 720 supra. Unfortunately, again, the materials give in-
sufficient information to determine for certain whether axiom I applies.
51. See pp. 721-22 supra.
52. 98 S. Ct. at 2765 app. (opinion of Powell, J.).
53. Id. at 2766 app.
54. Id. at 2765-66 app.
55. Id. at 2765 app.
56. Id. at 2766 app.
57. Id. The hypothetical is as follows:
The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itself forced
to choose between A, the child of a successful black physician in an academic com-
munity with promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black who grew up
in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose academic achievement was lower
728
Multicriteria Choice Processes
After reading the hypothetical, one is tempted to concur with Justice
Powell's assertion that race "is simply one element-to be weighed
fairly against other elements-in the selection process" so that the con-
stitutionally fatal "facial intent to discriminate"s evident in the Davis
Medical School "quotas" is absent. Yet the hypothetical assumes there
are "few [remaining] places to fill" in the class.59 By that point, the
admissions committee would presumably have admitted significant
numbers of blacks. Otherwise, Harvard could not fulfill its goal of
sufficient minority representation to assure "first-rate education to its
students."60 As a result, the weight given to minority status would be
lower than it would be if much of the class had been admitted but the
college was far short of its goal of sufficient minority representation. 61
The possibility theorem suggests that, in extreme circumstances, the
Harvard program would act as if it admits students under the follow-
ing rule of thumb: "only blacks shall fill the remaining places in the
class." If Harvard had admitted most of its class, but had admitted
very few black students, there would be a large premium granted to
black applicants. 62 If the situation were extreme enough, then any
minimally qualified black applicant might be preferred over any re-
maining nonblack applicant regardless of the nonblack applicant's
other qualifications. Such machinations constitute an effective but im-
precise quota. The probable violation of axiom IV suggests that this
effective quota must be implemented through an absolute-weights or
absolute-scale process at least in the form of rough rules of thumb.
3. The "Brennan Opinion" Critique
The "Brennan opinion" criticized Justice Powell's distinction be-
tween the Davis "quota" admissions policy and the Harvard program
but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently abiding
interest in black power. If a good number of black students much like A but few
like B had already been admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa.
If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic talent, were also seeking one of the
remaining places, his unique quality might give him an edge over both A and B.
Id.
58. Id. at 2763.
59. Id. at 2766 app.
60. Id. at 2765 app.; see pp. 730-31 infra.
61. In an MCCP with absolute weights, it might seem logical that the weights them-
selves would not change to reflect the goal of racial diversity, but one of the criteria would
take into account information about the number of candidates already admitted who be-
long to a disadvantaged group and about the number of spaces remaining to be filled in
the class. For purposes of exposition, the weights have been described as changing, al-
though one could view the weights themselves as fixed while a "racial diversity" criterion
varies.
62. The amount of the premium would depend on the number of blacks already
admitted to the class and on the number of spaces that remain to be filled.
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by hypothesizing an absolute-scale process designed to achieve approx-
imately the same number of minority admissions as a "quota" system: 03
There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional distinction
between, for example, adding a set number of points to the ad-
missions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as an ex-
pression of the preference with the expectation that this will result
in the admission of an approximately determined number of quali-
fied minority applicants and setting a fixed number of places for
such applicants as was done here. 4
The high likelihood that the Harvard program violates axiom IV
and uses an absolute scale or absolute weights suggests that this hy-
pothetical is exactly on point. Public choice analysis only strengthens
the criticisms in the "Brennan opinion" by suggesting that the weight
given to membership in a disadvantaged gToup will be higher if the
actual number of previously admitted applicants from the disad-
vantaged group is lower. Such a system would cause the automatic ful-
fillment of a rough quota.
Justice Powell also argued that the "Court would not assume that a
university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admis-
sions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent
of a quota system."' 5 The Harvard program was Justice Powell's
primary example of a process employing a facially nondiscriminatory
admissions policy. 66 Harvard's description of its admissions process
combined with the analysis in this article suggests, however, that that
program will operate as the functional equivalent of a quota system
when circumstances demand such a system to achieve adequate minority
representation. Since the Harvard admissions process probably em-
ploys a system of absolute weights or an absolute scale, further factual
inquiry should be undertaken before drawing the sort of distinction
63. The "Brennan opinion" did not use the term "absolute scale" to characterize its
hypothesized process. Against the background of the Davis program, in which each ap-
plicant's qualifications were reduced to a single numerical score, see 98 S. Ct. at 2740
(opinion of Powell, J.), however, the process hypothesized in the "Brennan opinion" sug-
gests an absolute scale. In a Davis-type process, disadvantaged minority applicants pre-
sumably would receive enough points added to their "rating" so that they would con-
stitute the desired proportion of the final admitted class. The idea of combining each
applicant's qualifications into a single numerical rating strongly suggests an absolute
scale process because each quality, including membership in a disadvantaged minority
group, is transferred onto the same scale of points.
64. Id. at 2794 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting) (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 2763.
66. The only other example that Justice Powell referred to was Princeton's under-
graduate admissions program which he described as being "similar" to Harvard's. See id.
at 2762 n.51.
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that Justice Powell does between the Harvard program and an ad-
missions process that directly employs quotas. When an absolute scale
or absolute weights underlie an admissions process, discovery of the
exact nature of the scale or weights is the most important step in
deciding whether the process meets constitutional standards. Justice
Powell's facial constitutionality test only would be appropriate for
hypothetical processes not subject to examination at the trial level. 7
Finally, the fact that an absolute scale or absolute weights probably
are used at Harvard, but are hidden from view, supports the "Brennan
opinion" view that Harvard's program approximates the Davis quota
system; as the opinion states, the only difference is that the Harvard
program "proceeds in a manner that is not immediately apparent to
the public" since it "does not ... make public the extent of the prefer-
ence [for minority students] and the precise workings of the system." 6s
The "Brennan opinion" captured most of the results that can be
achieved by an application of public choice theory to admissions pro-
cesses. In the administrative area, however, the defects of particular
decision processes have not been as apparent to judges and com-
mentators.
II. The Use of Internally Inconsistent Multicriteria
Choice Processes by Administrative Agencies
Administrative agencies sometimes use MCCPs to make regulatory
decisions."" This discussion focuses on FCC use of an MCCP in initial
67. Justice Stevens emphasized that the focus of the case should be on the Davis
process. See id. at 2809-10 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Because the case could be decided based on federal statutes and the facts about
the Davis admissions process, Justice Stevens found that no consideration should properly
have been given to admissions programs not before the Court. See id. at 2809-10, 2815.
68. Id. at 2794.
It has been asserted that decision processes that hide the actual mechanics of decision
may be desirable when a decision involves a clash of fundamental values. Resolving the
issue explicitly would involve the painful choice of one value over another when both are
held dear. See G. CALABRES & P. BoBBiTr, TRAGIC CHoxcEs 24-26, 57-58 (1978). Justice
Powell cited as one reason for holding a quota system unconstitutional the fact that such
a system "will be viewed as inherently unfair by the public generally as well as by ap-
plicants for admission," since "[flairness in individual competition . . . especially [for
benefits] provided by the State, is a widely cherished American ethic." 98 S. Ct. at 2763
r.53 (emphasis added). But see Calabresi, Bakke: Lost Candor, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1978,
at A19, col. 3 (conflict between equality-of-opportunity ethic and goal of reparations for
past bias should not justify subterfuge in admissions process; subterfuge should be reserved
for situations in which "irreconcilable fundamental principles are at stake and openly
affirming one value destroys the other").
69. Although FCC initial broadcast licensing is the only example discussed extensively
in this article, there are other instances of MCCPs used by administrative agencies. For
example, until recently, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) used an MCCP to award
domestic airline routes. Although the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 directed the CAB to
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broadcast licensing comparative hearings ("comparative hearings") to
select one broadcaster from a set of candidates for the exclusive right to
broadcast over a particular wavelength in a particular region. Although
the focus is on one kind of regulation by one agency, the same type of
analysis can generate similar policy conclusions about MCCPs used by
other administrative agencies.
This discussion first describes FCC comparative hearings and then
demonstrates that each of the nine axioms described previously are
either physical constraints or legal requirements for the hearing process.
Since public choice theory dictates that the hearing process cannot obey
all of the axioms, the second part of this section discusses the likelihood
that the MCCP violates particular axioms and the legal and normative
implications of the violations; it concludes by using the analysis pre-
viously developed to evaluate various proposals to reform FCC com-
parative hearings.
A. FCC Initial Broadcast Licensing Comparative Hearings and the
Applicability of the Nine Axioms
1. The FCC Initial Broadcast Licensing Comparative Hearing
Process as an MCCP
The FCC has allocated the broadcast spectrum to various uses, in-
cluding radio and television transmission. The Commission has al-
located radio and television channels to communities throughout the
United States.70 Since only one broadcaster can use a frequency in a
authorize service on any route as "required by the public convenience and necessity," 49
U.S.C. § 1371 (1970), the Board has often withheld route authority from all but one
applicant. See, e.g., Chicago-New Orleans Nonstop Route Proceeding, 2 Av. L. REP.
(CCH) 22,234 (1977); Chicago-Montreal Route Proceeding, 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 22,224
(1976).
The CAB awarded routes on the basis of a set of criteria, including the number of
passengers who would receive service for the first time, the strength of a challenge to a
foreign carrier, the amount of revenue diverted from existing carriers, the total beyond-
area benefits, and the need for carrier strengthening. See, e.g., Phoenix-Des Moines/
Milwaukee Route Proceeding, 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 22,255.02, at 15,051-54 (1978);
Chicago-Montreal Route Proceeding, 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 22,224, at 14,875 (1976). Rank-
ings under each criterion were combined to pick authorized carriers.
Recent changes in the operations of the CAB have made this description obsolete, see
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AIRLINE DEREGULATION, H.R. Doc. No.
92, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and the CAB's authority to restrict the number of airlines
serving particular routes will lapse altogether on December 31, 1981, Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40(a), 92 Stat. 1744 (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1601).
70. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-13 (1946); 47
C.F.R. § 73.202 (1977) (FM radio); id. § 73.606 (television); Anthony, Towards Simplicity
and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1,
7-10 (1971).
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particular region at any given time, the FCC must often pick a single
licensee from among several applicants. When no legally qualified
broadcaster wishes to renew an existing license for a particular fre-
quency, the Commission grants an "initial broadcast license" for the
frequency. 71 The Commission's choice process employs an MCCP and
is divided into application and hearing phases.
In the application phase, the FCC determines whether or not ap-
plicants meet minimal qualifications for receiving a license.72 In mak-
ing that determination, the FCC's Broadcast Bureau scrutinizes ap-
plicants for legal,73 financial, 74 technical, 75 and moral 70 soundness. In
addition, the Bureau reviews other factors related to the "public in-
terest," including program service plans, concentration of control of
the mass media, and any allegations of an applicant's anticompetitive
or monopolistic practices. 77 After these preliminary evaluations, every
application is forwarded to the Chief of the Broadcast Bureau who
71. Until recently, the FCC treated hearings involving competition between a broad-
caster wishing to renew a license and broadcasters wishing to obtain the license for the
first time quite differently from hearings involving only initial licensing. See Anthony,
supra note 70, at 106-10. "Renewal" hearings in which potential new licensees take part
have now become similar to initial broadcast hearings in their governing standards and
procedures. See In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Ap-
plicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 430 (1977) (if
applicant meets certain standards of past performance that are higher than those mini-
mally required for renewal, then renewal may follow without making comparison with
other applicants for license; otherwise renewal candidate will be considered in normal
comparative hearing except that renewal candidate will be favored to some degree on
basis of "legitimate renewal expectancy"). The Supreme Court, however, has recently held
that the Commission may use different standards in comparative renewal hearings than
in initial broadcast licensing comparative hearings. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 810-11 (1978).
The discussion in this article is limited to the choice process used to select a licensee
in initial broadcast licensing comparative hearings. Technically, the procedures described
in this article apply only to granting the right to construct a broadcast facility. The right
to broadcast over the facility, however, is routinely granted once construction has been
completed. Anthony, supra note 70, at 11. As a result, this article will treat comparative
construction permit hearings as comparative license hearings.
72. The application phase limits consideration at the hearing phase to "potential
alternatives" in the sense of axiom I. See p. 721 supra ("potential alternative" or
"minimally qualified candidate" is one who will be chosen if no other alternatives or
candidates are available); p. 769 infra (technical definition of potential alternative);
Anthony, supra note 70, at 34.
73. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (Supp. V 1975) (requiring applicant, its directors, of-
ficers, partners, and four-fifths of its stockholders to be United States citizens); 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.35 (1977) (applicant may not own any AM radio or television station in same market
as AM station that is being awarded).
74. See Anthony, sulbra note 70, at 18-19.
75. See id. at 18 (technical factors include availability of frequency, coverage and clarity
of signal, studio location, antenna location, and equipment requirements).
76. See id. at 19.
77. See id. at 19-24.
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designates the set of minimally qualified applicants for a comparative
hearing before a hearing examiner7s
In the hearing phase, the FCC selects a single licensee from this set
of qualified applicants. The relevant federal statute, the Communica-
tions Act of 1934,79 provides meager guidance for choosing a licensee.
The statute merely states that the FCC shall grant a license to an
applicant if the Commission finds "that the public convenience, in-
terest or necessity would be served" by such a grant. s0 The courts and
the FCC have understood this language as mandating the selection "on
a comparative basis" of the applicant who will best serve the public
interest."' In response to this vague mandate, the FCC created an
MCCP for choosing among applicants in a comparative hearing. The
Commission's 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hear-
ings 2 describes the MCCP and lists six criteria that are intended to
dictate the choice between minimally qualified applicants for an initial
broadcast license.83
The six criteria are diversification of control of the media, integra-
tion of ownership and management, proposed program service, past
broadcast record, likely degree of efficiency in use of the frequency,
and character. The 1965 policy statement describes the diversification
criterion as "a factor of primary significance."8 4 The diversification
criterion rests on the belief that diffusing control of the mass com-
munication media will produce an increased flow of information to the
public.8 Under this criterion, an applicant who does not own or con-
trol any other media interests will be preferred to one who does. An
applicant who has existing media interests is further disfavored under
the diversification criterion to the extent that his interests "are larger,
78. Id. at 34. If some question arises as to the minimal qualifications of one or more
of the applicants, the applications may be routed through the full Commission before
being sent to a hearing examiner. Id.
79. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
80. Id. § 309(a).
81. Ulysses Sherman Bartmcss & W.H. Hansen, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,064-65 (1970); see note
139 infra (citing cases).
82. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Policy Statement].
83. The two goals that shaped the FCC's choice of criteria were "first, the best prac-
ticable service to the public, and, second, a maximum diffusion of control of the media
of mass communications." id. at 394.
In addition to the six criteria listed in text, the FCC may insert "other factors" into
comparative hearings. Id. at 399. The existence of other factors in particular hearings
does not affect the analysis. One is merely faced with an MCCP that has more than six
criteria. In addition, a leading commentator on the FCC comparative hearing process has
stated that use of "other factors" is "rare." Anthony, supra note 70, at 43.
84. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 394.
85. See id. at 394 n.4.
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i.e., go towards complete ownership and control."8 6 Such interests are
also more detrimental to the degree that they are in media "in, or close
to, the community being applied for," or are "significant" because they
reach large numbers of people in a locality or extend to regional or
national coverage.87
The 1965 policy statement attributes "substantial importance" to
the factor of "integration of ownership and management."88s This
criterion reflects the view that owner participation in station manage-
ment increases a station's responsiveness to its legal duties and to the
broadcast area's changing needs.89 Accordingly, an applicant that plans
to integrate ownership and management will be preferred to one that
does not. The number and nature of the factors used to discriminate
between applicants under the integration criterion may, however, make
ranking applicants difficult.90 For example, an owner's full-time par-
ticipation is greatly preferred to part-time work,91 but the importance
of an owner's work will depend on his actual activities at the station,
his past broadcast experience, and his residence within the broadcast
area.
92
In its 1965 policy statement the FCC admitted that, although pro-
gram service is crucially important to the public, "[t]he feasibility of
making a comparative evaluation is not so obvious." 93 The FCC expects
each applicant to ascertain the broadcast needs of the community and
to design an adequate program plan for those needs. In the absence of
"material and substantial differences between applicants' proposed
program plans,"9 4 however, the Commission gives no weight to this
criterion.95
Another criterion employed by the FCC concerns the applicant's
performance in previous ownership or management of a broadcast
station. When the Commission evaluates this criterion of "past broad-
cast record," it is seeking an indication of the applicant's likely future
performance. Although the FCC will disregard a past broadcast record
within the bounds of average performance,96 it will consider both un-
usually good and unusually poor records.
86. Id. at 395.
87. Id. at 395-96.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Anthony, supra note 70, at 29 n.169.
91. See 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 395.




96. Id. at 398.
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The final two criteria are likely efficiency in using the frequency
and the applicant's character. The FCC will favor an applicant pro-
posing technically superior service . It will disfavor applicants with
serious character deficiencies, 98 but will disregard character considera-
tions in the absence of such serious defects.90
The FCC ranks the applicants under each of the applicable criteria,
sometimes ranking ordinally 10 and sometimes hinting at preference
size. 1°1 Finally, the rankings are combined, in some undefined manner,
to choose a licensee. The 1965 policy statement states that the process
is "inherently complex" and that "the subject does not lend itself to
precise categorization or to the clear making of precedent."' 1 2 Further-
more, the Commission asserts that the various criteria "cannot be as-
signed absolute values."' 1 3 The importance of any one criterion is only
determinable "upon consideration of the circumstances and conditions
before us in an actual hearing case.'
0 4
2. Different Ways in which the Axioms Can Apply to an
Administrative Process
Particular axioms can constrain an administrative process in several
ways. First, an axiom can be a "physical constraint," a constraint im-
posed not by human institutions but by technological or natural limita-
tions. For example, it is not physically possible with present technology
for two broadcasters to share the same frequency at the same time in
the same region. Thus, the FCC must grant only one broadcast license
for each frequency in a region at a given time.' 05
"Explicit legal constraints" and "implicit legal constraints" are two
97. See id. at 398-99.
98. Id. at 399.
99. See id. The general exclusion of character evidence is intended to prevent an ap-
plicant from turning "the hearing into a search for his opponents' minor blemishes, no
matter how remote in the past or how insignificant." Id.
100. An ordinal ranking is one that specifies the order in which applicants are ranked
but gives no other information. A ranking that is constructed by assigning each applicant
a number expressing how much that applicant is preferred is a "cardinal," as opposed to
ordinal, ranking.
101. See, e.g., Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 21 (1972) (specification of
degree of preference for some applicants over others under various criteria as "small" or
as -substantial"); WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 767, 860-61 (1957) (under civic participation
criterion, two applicants entitled to "some preference" over third applicant and to
"significant preference" over fourth applicant).
102. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 393.
103. Id.
104. WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 767, 858-59 (1957).
105. Note that the FCC's MCCP could theoretically choose more than one applicant
to receive a license. In such a case, the FCC would have to resort to means other than its
MCCP to narrow the field to one applicant. See note 117 infra (axiom requiring that
MCCP choose only one applicant from any group of applicants is not physical constraint).
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other kinds of axiomatic limitations on administrative agencies. A legal
constraint is explicit when courts have indicated that an agency must
obey the constraint. Implicit legal constraints are easily constructed
extrapolations of present legal doctrine that have never been con-
sidered explicitly by courts.106 This second type of constraint is im-
portant because administrative agencies and courts will sometimes not
have cause to consider or explicate various aspects of agency decision-
making with the degree of rigor required for application of highly
precise axioms.' 07
Three kinds of legal principles are particularly important in the
analysis of FCC comparative hearings. The Commission must (1)
comply with the statutory provisions that establish and govern it;08
(2) use procedures that meet the minimal standards of procedural due
106. See, e.g., pp. 743-44 infra (arguments, by extrapolation from physical and ex-
plicit legal constraints, that axioms VII and ViII are implicit legal constraints on FCC).
Although implicit legal constraints are based on extrapolations from existing legal
principle, and have never actually been imposed by courts, they are acceptable as binding
constraints under the theory that existing legal principle is to be taken seriously because
courts derive their legitimacy in a democracy from making principled decisions. See notes
211 & 235 infra.
As understood here, explicit legal constraints embody a legal realist's conception of the
role of law in society, i.e., "law" as an expression of courts' holdings, and nothing more.
See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. R.v. 457, 457 (1897) (object of study of
law is "prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts"). Alternatively, implicit legal constraints, relying as they do upon an evaluation
of the FCC's statutory mandate, institutional setting, and relation to the courts, reflect a
far broader notion of what is law in our society. It may nevertheless be true that even
legal realists will ultimately have to see the FCC's implicit legal constraints as "law."
This change would be the result of the new, activist role that the D.C. Circuit has been
playing with respect to the FCC. See, e.g., Central Fla. Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 4 MEDIA
L. REP. (BNA) 1502 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978), amended, No. 76-1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12,
1979) (renewal hearing). Since all of the implicit constraints discussed here are easily
linked to accepted legal rules, it seems likely that they would be enforced by the D.C.
Circuit in an appropriate case.
Only one who argued that the law is nothing more than an expression of what the
courts have actually done and are actually likely to do would claim that some of the
axioms are not properly called "law." Such a person would see the implicit constraints as
merely elements that must be hidden in the FCC's opinion writing process in order for
the opinion to escape reversal.
107. Sometimes this effect results from the technical nature of the axioms. See p.
743 & note 147 infra (unlikely that agencies or courts have ever considered impact of
"agenda" influences on institutional decisionmaking processes). In other situations, an
axiom may express a principle that is so obviously inherent in a decision process that it
may never be considered explicitly. See note 151 infra (principle that candidate inferior
to another under all criteria used will not be chosen may be so obvious as never to be
considered). The difficulties inherent in applying axioms to real-world institutions have
been recognized elsewhere. See Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and
Interpretation, 20 Am. J. POLITICAL SCI. 511, 555 (1976) (need usually to focus on models
of processes rather than real-world processes themselves; "only a few [real-world] processes
can be modeled with the degree of precision required by [axiomatic] methods").
108. See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 144-45 (1940); Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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process; 10 9 and (3) avoid decisions that are arbitrary and capricious,
i.e., lacking any reason to support them.110
The procedural due process standards include the requirement that
an agency cannot ignore its own precedents and previously enunciated
policies. It must either adhere to the precedents and policies or explain
the reasons for departing from them."' The FCC therefore must honor
previous claims about its decisionmaking process made in case law or
in policy statements. 12 Although the claims may have been imposed
by the FCC on itself, they operate as legal constraints.
The principle that agency decisions must not be "arbitrary and
capricious" requires that an agency use "reasoned decisionmaking."
Whether the decisions are made in adjudication or policymaking, a
reasoned basis must be provided."1 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, the court with exclusive jurisdic-
tion to hear appeals from FCC comparative hearings," 4 has stated that
"reasoned decisionmaking" as opposed to "bidding" or "chance" must
be the basis of choices between potential licensees, even "when a
certificating agency is required to choose between two or more ap-
plicants endowed with virtually equivalent qualifications."' 1
109. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
110. See id.; Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(B)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
111. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir.
1975) ("an agency is not required to adhere to a prior policy with iron rigidity" but law
requires that agency "explain the reasons for its modification"); UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d
1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (principle that "agency must either conform to its own
precedents or explain its departure from them" is "elementary tenet of administrative
law").
112. See, e.g., Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 & nA5 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (FCC cannot examine only single criterion of technical efficiency in granting
initial license; doing so would be departure from long-settled precedent mandating that
multiple criteria be examined); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dictum) (special judicial vigilance required when agency changes its
policies; agency "must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and stan-
dards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored").
113. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968) (rate setting
must be done only after "reasoned consideration .. .of the pertinent factors"); Rhode
Island Consumers' Council v. FPC, 504 F.2d 203, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (record only vaguely
describes reasons for agency action; it must "disclose with unmistakable clarity the rea-
sons" for action).
The requirement that changes in policy or departures from precedent must be accom-
panied by "reasoned decisionmaking" is distinct from the previous point that an agency
must follow the rules and policies that it has enunciated. The reasoned decisionmaking
requirement restricts the ways by which an agency can change its policies, even when it
does so openly.
114. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970); see Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d
246, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1974).




3. The Applicability of the Nine Axioms to FCC Comparative
Broadcast Licensing Hearings
It is not difficult to demonstrate that each of the nine axioms dis-
cussed above is a physical or legal constraint on FCC comparative
hearings. Axiom I requires the FCC to choose only one licensee for any
given broadcast license. 110 The axiom, for example, eliminates any
MCCP that selects several "winners" and then randomly chooses one
of them to receive the license. This requirement is an explicit legal
constraint on the choice process, 117 which must proceed by reasoned
distinctions and not by "chance" even when the applicants being com-
pared are nearly identical. The District of Columbia Circuit has man-
dated that, between two applicants, comparative hearings "must reveal
which would better" serve the public interest." 8 Since two applicants
cannot simultaneously "better" serve the public interest, the FCC's
MCCP must choose exactly one winning licensee on the basis of sub-
stantive "public interest" considerations contained in the criteria.
Axiom II requires that there be at least three minimally qualified
potential applicants for each initial licensing decision. 1 9 Because the
axiom speaks of potential applicants, it is not necessary that three
minimally qualified applicants actually apply. There need only be at
least three minimally qualified possible applicants in the world. This
requirement is necessarily satisfied because any given region contains
a large number of minimally qualified potential applicants for a broad-
cast license.' 20 In practice, FCC comparative hearings often include
116. See pp. 720-21 supra.
117. The FCC is not physically constrained to use an MCCP that results in exactly
one winner. It could use an MCCP that selected several of the applicants as winners and
then choose one licensee from the set of "winning" applicants. This final choice, which
would not be part of the MCCP, could be by lottery or by some other method not related
to the MCCP.
118. Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (emphasis
added). Although Johnston Broadcasting was decided before the 1965 Policy Statement,
supira note 82, the D.C. Circuit has subsequently stated that the case describes "the
decisional process to be followed" in FCC comparative hearings. Star Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 416 F.2d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969). Although many of
the principles stated in Johnston Broadcasting can be taken as dicta, the Commission
seems to have adhered to the principles as scrupulously as to holdings in other cases. In
discussing the fact that much of Johnston Broadcasting can be read as dicta, a leading
commentator notes that nonetheless, "the Commission over the years seems to have ob-
served the court's dicta as solicitiously as its narrow holdings, and it is hard to escape the
impression that the court conceived its entire opinion [in Johnston Broadcasting] as a
detailed set of instructions to the Commission." Anthony, supra note 70, at 110 (footnote
omitted).
119. See p. 721 supra.
120. For example, any given region contains wealthy individuals of good character who
do not have any connection with broadcasting. These individuals could apply for a
license. They could, by employing the right individuals, establish a technically good, pro-
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 717, 1979
three or more minimally qualified applicants as competing can-
didates. 121
To satisfy axiom 111, the choice process must be able to consider any
conceivable minimally qualified applicant regardless of the character-
istics it possesses. 12 2 Because the FCC states that it will include any
minimally qualified applicant in a comparative hearing, 2' it appears
that this axiom is satisfied in practice. Indeed, for the same reason, com-
pliance with axiom III can be characterized as a legal requirement.
The Commission must obey its own policy directives unless it an-
nounces a policy change openly and offers a reasoned explanation. 2 4
Axiom IV forbids the use of absolute weights or absolute scales in
combining categorical rankings into a choice.1 25 The FCC incorporates
this axiom by presuming that criteria cannot be assigned "absolute
values."' 26 One commentator has described the process of combining
outcomes on the different criteria as one of "subjective 'weighing,' "127
because there are no absolute weights or absolute scales.' 28
gramatically responsive, and financially sound broadcasting company. In addition, the
owners could live in the communities that received the broadcasts and could take an
active role in the management of the station.
121. See, e.g., Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 1-2 (1972) (five minimally
qualified applicants); WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 767, 767-68 (1957) (four minimally qualified
applicants).
122. See p. 721 supra.
123. See pp. 733-34 supra.
124. See p. 738 supra.
The courts will enforce the reasoned decisionmaking requirement. See pp. 742-43
infra (use of single criterion in contravention of 1965 policy statement and without ex-
planation is illegal and would not be tolerated by court); Central Fla. Enterprises, Inc. v.
FCC, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1502, 1509-11 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978), amended, No. 76-
1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1979) (renewal hearing) (FCC did not give adequate rationale for
its decision; FCC orders vacated and case remanded to Commission)..
125. See pp. 721-22 supra.
126. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 393.
The FCC has designated three criteria as of "primary" or "substantial" importance.
Anthony, supra note 70, at 42-43. As Anthony points out, however, there is no specifica-
tion of which of the three criteria take precedence in case of conflict. Id. at 43. In addi-
tion, there is no discussion of the relative importance of several other criteria. Yet these
other criteria sometimes override the criteria described as primary. See id. at 43 & n.248.
Thus, the FCC's hints as to the relative importance of some of the criteria give little
indication of relative importance in practice.
127. Id. at 42.
128. See id. at 42-44:
Fundamental are the problems of subjectivity presented by the need to choose the
winning applicants on the basis of multiple preferences drawn from multiple criteria.
-.. There is no comprehensive system of priorities that establishes whether or when
or to what extent one kind of preference ... should have more weight than another.
... The decision makers thus lack principles to govern them in deciding whether the
preferences [for] one applicant [on the criteria] outweigh those [for] another [on
other criteria].
The complexities and uncertainties of reaching ultimate decision are carried even
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The 1965 policy statement and case law prior to it indicate a belief
that use of absolute scales or absolute weights in comparative hearings
would be impossible. 12 9 Experience and the nature of the criteria
themselves suggest that this belief is well founded. At times it has been
extremely difficult for the FCC merely to rank applicants ordinally. 130
In addition, the nature of the criteria seems to defy application of an
absolute scale even to a single criterion. Each criterion breaks down
into a large number of elements that are difficult to compare, and
under any one element there is a large degree of variability in possible
applicant characteristics. 13 For example, the diversity criterion com-
pares an applicant's existing media interests on the basis of extent of
control, proximity to the community that the new licensee will serve,
size and area of audience, significance of regional or national coverage,
and significance with respect to other media.' 32
In any event, axiom IV, like axiom III, operates as a legal constraint
on the FCC because there exists an announced policy against the as-
signment of absolute values to the various criteria. Until this policy is
changed publicly, the Commission cannot legally grant licenses on the
basis of a secret or open set of absolute weights or an absolute scale.'
33
Axiom V requires that there be a complete binary relation'" within
any possible set of minimally qualified potential applicants for each
license, and that the MCCP choose a more desirable applicant over a
further by the fact that the preferences to be weighed are variable in size. This
variability raises the problem of how to weigh against each other, for example, a
"substantial" preference from one subject area and "moderate" or "slight" preferences
awarded under other headings....
The Commission has established no principles or standards to govern this ultimate
step [of weighing the preferences for one applicant under some criteria against the
preferences for another under one criteria] in the decision process.
129. See p. 740 suPra; Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) (there are "no essential absolutes" in comparing applicants; there are such
absolutes for determining if applicants are minimally qualified).
130. See, e.g., Moline Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263, 284-87 (1971) (Johnson,
Comm'r, dissenting) (renewal hearing) (renewal applicant should not have been ranked
higher on past programming record criterion than new applicant; new applicant should
have been given "substantial preference" under integration criterion); Flower City
Television Corp., 9 F.C.C.2d 249, 262 (1967) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting) (disagreeing
with majority's rankings under integration criterion).
131. See 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 393 ("differences between applicants
with respect to each factor are almost infinitely variable"); Anthony, supra note 70, at 46
(absolute scale cannot be established for present criteria because consideration under each
criterion involves too many variable factors).
132. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 395.
133. See p. 738 & note 124 supra.
134. A "complete binary relation" exists when the decisionmaker can specify, between
any two alternatives, that one is more desirable than the other or that the two are
equally desirable. See p. 722 supra; pp. 770-71 infra.
The Yale Law Journal
less desirable one.13 5 The FCC is required to satisfy this axiom because
of two explicit legal constraints. Under the principle of reasoned
decisionmaking, the Commission must choose between applicants in
some manner rationally related to its statutory duty to further the
"public convenience, interest or necessity."' 3 0 In addition, it must
choose only one applicant for any particular license. 13 7 These two
requirements are both satisfied only if the FCC is capable of de-
termining which of any two potential applicants would better serve the
public interest. If the Commission can make such a determination,
there exists a complete binary relation within any possible set of
potential applicants. 38 Moreover, because the public interest must
control every outcome, it would be unlawful for the FCC ever to select
a less desirable candidate over a more desirable one.139
If the outcome under one criterion determines the outcome in all
possible cases, axiom VI is violated. 40 This axiom is embodied in an
explicit legal constraint on the FCC. Appellate courts consistently
require that the FCC consider all material differences between ap-
plicants raised by the parties in a comparative hearing.' 4 ' In a recent
case, 14 2 the District of Columbia Circuit referred to "long-settled
precedent ' 143 in rebuking the FCC for apparently deciding between
applicants solely on the basis of the technical efficiency criterion. One
applicant had been excluded from consideration solely because it pro-
posed to broadcast a weaker signal than the other applicants. 4 4 The
court noted that the applicant's "other attributes might show that the
135. See pp. 722-23 suPra.
136. 47 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1970); see pp. 738-39 supra (choice among applicants must
proceed by reasoned distinctions; illegal to decide between applicants by chance).
137. See p. 739 supra.
138. In fact, there is more than a complete binary relation. Since the FCC must choose
only one applicant by its MCCP, it must be able to establish a strict preference between
any two applicants. Indifference as a result of a comparison would not allow the FCC to
choose between two applicants.
139. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-17 (1943);
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 n.2 (1940).
140. See p. 723 supra.
141. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677,
680 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951). The courts will not hesitate to overturn
licensing decisions that ignore relevant criteria put at issue by the parties. See Citizen's
Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FCC failed to give
adequate consideration to program service criterion because it did not inquire into
whether program format should be retained when it is "unique or otherwise serves a
specialized audience that would feel its loss").
142. Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
143. Id. at 1051.
144. Id. at 1048.
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satisfaction accorded to those who will listen counterbalances, as far as
the public interest is concerned, the fact that fewer could hear."'14
To satisfy axiom VII, the outcome of an MCCP must not be affected
by a change in the "agenda" in any particular comparative hearing. 146
Specifically, the choice from a set of minimally qualified applicants
should be the same whether the choice is made directly from the whole
set or the set is divided into subsets and an overall winner is chosen
from the preliminary winners in each subset. There appear to be no
FCC or court decisions dealing specifically with agenda influences . 47
Axiom VII, however, is an implicit legal constraint following from the
explicit legal requirement that the FCC choose applicants on the basis
of the public interest 48 and from the requirement that the FCC be
able to specify which of any pair of minimally qualified applicants will
better serve the public interest. 49 Suppose that, under one agenda, ap-
plicant A would be chosen while, under a second agenda, applicant B
would be chosen. Assuming that the FCC can determine that one of
the two applicants will better serve the public interest, one of the
agendas would not choose this preferred applicant. A failure to adhere
to axiom VII would therefore be legally unacceptable.
Axiom VIII states that if there exists an applicant, A, who ranks
higher than applicant B under every criterion, then applicant B will
not be granted the license.'50 This requirement is an easy extrapolation
from certain explicit legal constraints.' 5 ' When courts support an FCC
initial license award that has been challenged as arbitrary or irrational,
they usually first point to the winner's superiority over the challenger
under certain criteria and then defer to the FCC's discretion in weigh-
ing and combining all of the criteria.15 2 But if the challenger were
superior under all criteria, such judicial support for the FCC decision
145. Id. at 1053.
146. See pp. 723-24 supra; p. 771 infra.
147. Although agenda influences may be detectable by agencies and courts in some
cases, see pp. 745-46 infra, the abstruse and technical nature of agenda influences make it
unlikely that the FCC, the courts, or the public have considered the general problem of
agenda influence on comparative hearings.
148. See pp. 738-39 supra.
149. See pp. 739, 742 supra.
150. See pp. 724-25 supra.
151. The lack of more explicit consideration by the FCC and by the courts of the
principle inherent in axiom VIII is probably caused by a perception that failing to follow
the principle would be a flagrant violation of the reasoned decisionmaking requirement.
See p. 738 supra. Thus, axiom VIII may be so far within the core of the law that the FCC
would not even consider violating it, at least explicitly.
152. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 64-65 (D.C. Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 918 (1961); Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204,
205-06 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956).
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would be impossible. In addition, courts will overturn an FCC decision
if the FCC has not considered all of the public interest criteria raised
by the parties.'5 3 If the FCC were to choose one applicant over another
that is superior under every criterion, it would have ignored all of the
criteria raised in the case. Such a decision would obviously be unlawful.
Axiom IX requires that, for any four applicants A, B, C, and D, if C
compares to D under the criteria as A compares to B, and if D is not
chosen over C, then B will not be chosen over A.154 In essence, the
axiom requires that an applicant's name or other irrelevant character-
istics not affect the choice. Axiom IX is an explicit legal constraint on
the FCC. If, in the hypothetical above, D were not chosen over C in one
case, then in a subsequent case the FCC would have to follow the
precedent and not choose B over A.155 The FCC could only ignore the
precedent if it could make reasoned distinctions between the two cases.
Yet if the two cases were identical under the public interest criteria, it
would not be possible to make such distinctions. 56
B. Determining which Axiom is Likely to be Violated by FCC
Comparative Hearings
The possibility theorem indicates that the FCC's MCCP cannot
simultaneously obey all nine axioms, even though all nine constitute
legal or physical contraints on comparative hearings. It seems clear,
therefore, that the FCC is legally required to use a choice process that
has internally inconsistent properties. Although such a conclusion
clashes with the principle that regulators and regulated parties should
not be subjected to contradictory legal requirements, 5 7 in practice,
the Commission must be violating one or more of the axioms. The
main task that remains is to determine which axioms are most likely
to be violated.
Axiom II is a physical constraint that binds the FCC in choosing
153. See pp. 742-43 & note 141 supra.
154. See p. 725 supra.
155. See p. 738 supra. The general principle that the FCC must follow its own
precedents or explain departures from them has been evident in the holdings of many
recent cases. See, e.g., Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056, 1060-61, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FCC
must adhere to its own precedents and reconcile its disposition with past decisional
practice; case remanded with instruction that FCC reevaluate its decision in light of its
own past precedents); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1027 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (FCC's "utter failure to come to grips with" past precedents "constitutes an in-
excusable departure from the essential requirement of reasoned decisionmaking").
156. In discussing axiom IX, the focus is on a single point in time. As a result, the
same policies must be in force for both cases.
157. See L. FULLER, TIE MORALITY OF LAw 69 (rev. ed. 1969) ("legislative careless-
ness about the jibe of statutes with one another can be very hurtful to legality").
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broadcast licensees.'"5 Some of the remaining eight axioms are unlikely
to be violated because such violations either would be easily detected
by reviewing courts or would require blatant dishonesty on the part
of the FCC. To violate axioms III, VI, or VIII and avoid judicial
detection, for example, the FCC would probably have to include false
information in its opinion. If the FCC were to violate axiom III by
refusing to consider a qualified candidate, violate axiom VI by using a
single criterion choice process, or violate axiom VIII by selecting a
candidate inferior under all criteria, it could not admit this conduct
openly without bringing about appellate reversal.'1"
It would also be extremely difficult to cover up violations of any of
these three axioms. Since there is a body of rules and decisions con-
cerning minimal qualifications, the Commission would have to fabri-
cate an entire comparative hearing decision in order to avoid com-
paring any minimally qualified applicant to others as required by
axiom III.100 If the same single criterion choice process were consis-
tently employed for any period of time, the pattern of the cases would
probably reveal that fact and, in each case, the FCC would have to
"pretend" to be considering the other criteria."" To violate axiom
VIII, the FCC would have to distort the case enough to make plausible
the selection of an applicant who was inferior under all criteria. 1 2
It would be far easier for the FCC to violate axiom VII. In the
abstract, the FCC's refusal to define precisely its choice process prevents
any theoretical check on possible agenda influences. In practice, it is
difficult to gauge the plausibility of either an inadvertent or deliberate
violation of axiom VII. In most cases, there are relatively few ap-
158. See pp. 739-40 suPra.
159. See pp. 742-43 supra (courts will overturn any FCC attempt to use single criterion
choice process); pp. 743-44 supra (violation of axiom VIII would be more serious than
other illegal administrative acts; axiom VIII is probably so deep within core of law that
agency would not violate it).
160. At least one recent case indicates that courts will detect and overturn FCC deci-
sions that are too implausible or depart too much from past precedents. See Central Fla.
Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1502, 1516 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978),
amended, No. 76-1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1979) (renewal hearing) (FCC order "is unsup-
ported by the record and the prior law on which it purported to rely").
161. An effort to "tell a story" in each case that directed attention away from the use
of a single criterion choice process would involve assessment in opinions of criteria that
were not given weight in the actual decision. Such an effort would almost certainly have
to be conscious.
162. It is likely that if any significant distortion were involved, courts would detect it
and vacate the FCC action. See Central Fla. Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 4 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 1502, 1510 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978), amended, No. 76-1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1979)
(renewal hearing) (1965 policy statement "imposed an orderliness on the inquiry which
made it obvious when applicants were not in fact on an equal footing").
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plicants' 6 3 and the FCC should be able to detect the end result of
agenda influences, at least when they lead to selection of an applicant
who is clearly inferior to at least one other applicant. In such a situa-
tion, a reviewing court could also detect this result. It would, however,
be unable to correct the underlying agenda influences, unless the FCC
had made these influences plain in its decision.0 Moreover, if one of
a group of quite similar applicants prevailed under the MCCP, de-
liberate or inadvertent agenda influences might be impossible for
anyone to detect.
The situation is roughly the same for axioms I and V. Although it
would probably be easy to detect a choice of a clearly inferior applicant
resulting from a violation of either axiom, it would be difficult to
determine which, if either, of these axioms had been violated. Even
worse, it would be virtually impossible to detect any problem at all
when the hearing compared a group of similar applicants. A violation
of axiom I would mean that that the FCC does not rely entirely on the
MCCP to choose one applicant. In some cases the FCC might use
chance or legally irrelevant considerations to choose a final licensee. In
order to do so, it would have to offer false reasons related to the public
interest in support of its decision. The same kind of deception would
be required to disguise the violation of axiom V that would take place
if the FCC were unable to distinguish between roughly similar can-
didates on the basis of public interest considerations,11 or chose to
select the less desirable of a pair of candidates. Yet, in any such case, it
would be easy to emphasize minor differences between candidates and
write a conclusory opinion that would pass muster. 6
163. Although the FCC often considers three or more minimally qualified applicants
for a particular license, the number rarely exceeds five or six for a particular case. See
note 121 supra (citing cases).
164. FCC opinions usually indicate the rankings of the applicants under Various criteria
and give sequential overall comparisons of applicants to explain the choice made. See,
e.g., Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 21-22 (1972); WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C.
767, 881-82 (1957). When only a few applicants are considered, it is difficult to imagine
that an applicant who is clearly inferior to another would be chosen because of agenda
influences. There would be a natural inclination to "test" the winner against other strong
candidates either as a final step in the decision process or in the opinion. As long as there
are only a few applicants, the FCC and the courts can easily compare the "winner" against
all the other applicants.
165. Commentators have recognized the possibility that the FCC may labor diligently
to write an opinion that rests solidly on public interest grounds. See H. FRIENDLY, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 59-60 (1962) (FCC opinions sometimes include "tortuous
argumentation wherein the opinion writer seeks to give the successful applicant a prefer-
ence under every 'criterion' or at least to minimize its disadvantage"); id. at 63 (changes in
policy may be disguised so that "the opinion writers remain free to pull (the prior
authorities] out of the drawer whenever the agency wishes to reach a result supportable
by the old rule but not the new").
166. The FCC usually simply states the rankings of various applicants under different
criteria and then selects a licensee after a sequence of conclusory comparisons between
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Axioms IV and IX could be violated most easily and with the least
chance of detection because either axiom may be violated without any
conscious falsification on the part of the Commission. The FCC can
violate axiom IV without consciously using absolute scales or absolute
weights if it uses rough rules of thumb to compare the significance of
characteristics under different criteria. Use of rough rules of thumb
can violate axiom IV as effectively as use of absolute weights or of an
absolute scale.167 Moreover, it would be hard to detect a deliberate or
inadvertent violation of axiom IV, even if the comparative hearing
process did not violate any of the other axioms. 1 8 As long as the FCC
claims that "[the weight to be given to each factor is dependent upon
the circumstances of each particular case,"' 169 no rationale need support
the use of particular weights in any given case other than talismanic
public interest language. As a result, it would be easy to hide absolute
weights or absolute scales behind a facade of conclusory statements
much like those that presently characterize FCC opinions. Further, the
rough rules of thumb might shift over time as the Commission changed
its conception of the public interest. The FCC would feel no need to
articulate the change since the weights used in any decision could be
characterized as unique.17 0 Such circumstances would probably prevent
detection of a system of absolute weights. One could not distinguish
between the claim that no absolute weights or absolute scales are used
and the claim that such weights and scales are used, but the precise
weights or scales change over time.' 7 '
applicants based on performance under all of the criteria. See note 164 supra (citing cases).
Since the treatment of the significance of comparative performance under each criterion
is conclusory, as long as a candidate is superior under at least one criterion, that candidate
can be chosen. In fact, commentators have noted that the comparative hearing process
seems to operate without any apparent rules governing the combination of criteria into a
choice. See note 171 infra.
167. See pp. 721-22 suPra.
168. If some of the other axioms are violated, detection of a violation of axiom IV
would be even more difficult. For example, if the FCC violated axiom IX by letting
influences not covered by the criteria affect the decision, then decisions might be too
haphazard to allow detection of absolute weights or absolute scales.
169. Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1176 (1951). The FCC repeated this assertion
after its 1965 policy statement. See p. 736 supra.
170. Although there is a requirement both that changes in policy be articulated and
that a reasoned explanation be given for the changes, see p. 738 supra, if the FCC
uses different weights in each particular case, there is no general policy to alter or explain.
171. Commentators have repeatedly noted that the FCC operates with no rules for the
combination of criteria into a choice. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 165, at 67 (FCC
"must develop enough courage to penetrate the fog it has helped create" by revealing
clearly what weight newspaper ownership will carry); Botein, Comparative Broadcast
Licensing Procedures and the Rule of Law: A Fuller Investigation, 6 GA. L. Rav. 743,
752-54 (1972) (FCC comparative hearings operate under vague and contradictory criteria
and are inherently subjective). In a statistical analysis of comparative hearings for grant-
ing television stations, one study has even shown that qualities that the FCC claims
The Yale Law Journal
If the FCC's MCCP violates axiom IX, then factors not among the
criteria claimed to comprise the MCCP may enter into the decision
process. In this case, the FCC would have to hide its use of outside
factors by not revealing the entire basis for its decision. Axiom IX,
however, can also be violated without any intent to deceive on the part
of the Commission. The objectives of the decision process may be so ill-
defined that identical cases are not necessarily decided identically. 172
A violation of axiom IX arising in this manner would be difficult
to detect. Absolutely identical cases will never arise, and it is hard
to evaluate the significance of small variations from case to case when
the weights that criteria will receive in different cases are as ill-defined
as they are at present.
This discussion indicates the futility of attempting to establish def-
initely, by empirical analysis, which of the nine axioms is violated.
The more difficult it is to detect the violation of any particular axiom,
the more likely it is that the axiom is, in fact, violated. When detection
is easy, appellate review and public criticism will forestall or rapidly
correct violations. Conversely, difficult detection may tempt the Com-
mission to commit violations.
C. General Implications of this Analysis
1. The Seriousness of the Problem
One might suggest that, despite the results derived here, the compara-
tive hearing works well enough to be continued. It is important, how-
ever, to recognize the seriousness of the comparative hearing's defects.
Any violation of an axiom by the FCC constitutes a violation of a legal
standard. In addition, some of the most likely violations are also the
most serious. If axiom I is violated, the FCC does not, or cannot,
despite its claims, rely entirely on its MCCP to choose a single broad-
are desirable actually have lessened an applicant's chances of being awarded a license.
See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC AsrECTs OF TELEvIsION REGULATION
112-14 (1973).
One recent case may indicate some judicial awareness of this problem. See Central Fla.
Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1502, 1510 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978),
amended, No. 76-1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1979) (renewal hearing) (FCC has not "even
vaguely described how it aggregated its findings into the decisive balance," but simply
indicated that it relied on "'administrative "feel" '" ; "[s]uch intuitional forms of decision-
making, completely opaque to judicial review, fall somewhere on the distant side of
arbitrary").
172. The Commission has only the vague statutory standard of the "public convenience,
interest or necessity" as an ultimate guide for its choices. See p. 734 suPra; H. FRIENDLY,
supra note 165, at 54-57 (vagueness of congressional mandate leaves FCC to perform
frustrating task with little guidance).
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cast licensee in each case. 173 If axiom V is violated, the Commission
either cannot draw distinctions based on the statutory public interest
standard, or it makes some decisions directly contrary to that stan-
dard.' 74 If axiom IV is violated, then the Commission uses a secret
system of absolute scales or absolute weights despite claims to the con-
trary. 17 If axiom IX is violated, then irrelevant factors are influencing
decisions or the choice process is so ill-defined that identical cases may
not be decided identically. 70 Each of these violations contravenes
deeply-held tenets of the administrative process: those subject to the
process are entitled to be given at least a rudimentary knowledge of its
operation, 77 and agencies gain their power from and must adhere to
the statutory purposes specified by the legislative branch.178
The possibility theorem's attack upon comparative hearings is bol-
stered by commentators' criticisms. Three common criticisms of the
process are that it fails to implement the policy objectives inherent in
the agency's own criteria, 79 that its extreme vagueness engenders a
173. See p. 739 suPra.
174. See pp. 741-42 supra.
175. See pp. 740-41 supra. The secret use of absolute scales or absolute weights may
not be deliberate. See p. 747 supra.
176. See pp. 744, 748 supra.
177. See p. 738 supra (reasoned decisionmaking requirements). Some commentators
have contended that when there is an allocative decision that involves a clash of
fundamental values, it may be desirable to allow the clash to be resolved in a way that
does not appear to violate either value. Such a result is usually accomplished via "sub-
terfuges" that hide the fact that one value will be sacrificed for the sake of another. See
note 68 supra. It is doubtful, however, that these commentators would judge that preserv-
ing all of the axioms, especially IV and VI, which could be violated without sacrificing
the principles of rational decisionmaking, is a vital enough objective to justify subterfuge.
178. In theory, Congress cannot delegate power to agencies unless it does so by legisla-
tion whose "explicit or reasonably discernible implicit purposes, and . . . history, taken
together" provide "the administrator with sufficiently clear guidance" so that a reviewing
court "can 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.'" McGowan, Con-
gress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 1119, 1127-28 (1977)
(footnote omitted). In practice this "delegation doctrine" is never used by federal courts to
strike down legislation. Id. at 1127. Judge McGowan, however, has suggested that it might
be appropriate to revive the doctrine for cases "in which Congress debates alternative
policy choices entirely feasible for it to make, but chooses instead to compromise the
matter by delegation in order to get a bill enacted or to avert the assumption of direct
responsibility." Id. at 1129-30 (footnotes omitted). In the Judge's opinion, such cases in-
volve "a subversion of the democratic decisionmaking contemplated by the Constitution,
as well as an imposition upon both the administrative process and judicial review." Id. at
1130 (footnote omitted).
179. See note 171 supra; Fisher, The President's Comment, 21 FED. CoM. B.J. 117, 118
(1967) (procedures have "not reflected the only two policy principles [diversification of
ownership and integration of management and ownership] of consequence in the broad-
cast field"); Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications
Commission, 63 GEo. L.J. 705, 715-18 (1975) (criteria and standards for combining them
often ignored or unsatisfactorily explained away; failure to implement policies inherent
in many criteria is evident and there is some evidence that political or other biases
dictate some decisions).
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gTeat potential for illegitimate influences, 180 and that it is too time-
consuming and expensive."8' The first criticism is clearly related to
possible violations of the axioms. If axiom IX is violated, then either
the criteria are applied inconsistently or factors other than the criteria
affect decisions. If axiom I or the first part of axiom V are violated, then
the decision process does not use the criteria as the sole vehicle for
choosing licensees. If the second part of axiom V is violated, the MCCP
picks the less desirable of a pair of applicants. If axiom VI is violated,
all but one of the criteria are ignored. If axiom VIII is violated, then
an applicant who is inferior to another under every criterion may be
chosen. If axiom VII is violated, then the agenda as well as the criteria
influence the decision. Only a violation of axiom IV might not involve
a serious departure from the policies inherent in the criteria, but even
if that axiom is violated, continual shifting of the weights, scales, or
rough rules of thumb employed can leave the impression that the
policies underlying the criteria are not implemented in a consistent
manner.
1 8 2
The possibility theorem also helps illuminate the fear that illicit in-
fluences might enter into the process. Three of the five axioms most
likely to be violated, I, V, and IX, are axioms that limit the process to
a decision based on the criteria.' s If the comparative hearing process
violates any of these axioms, then it is likely that outside and possibly
illicit influences affect the decision process.'8 4
Finally, given the nature of the axioms and the fact that one of them
must be violated, it is not surprising that the comparative hearing pro-
cess has turned out to be costly and time-consuming. If no absolute
180. See Geller, supra note 179, at 715-18 (flexibility of process FCC uses in selecting
licensees leads to heavy role for preferences of commissioners); Johnson, A New Fidelity
to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869, 883, 885 (1971) (discussing attempts by those
regulated by FCC to influence Commission via lobbying and public relations campaigns;
"deferred bribe" of future employment with broadcasters may affect decisionmaking by
FCC personnel); Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 GEo. L.J. 1, 24-25
(1961) (applicants may attempt to influence FCC through congressional pressure, by ap-
proaching commissioners who may be dependent on applicant for future employment, or
by making inflated and impossible claims about future performance).
181. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 70, at 47 (uncertainty in and diversity of issues are
primary cause for length and complexity of comparative hearings; lawyers in such situa-
tion will quite properly assemble huge record in order not to fail to point out any fact
that may help client obtain license-result in many cases is vast amount of irrelevant
material in record); Levin, supra note 180, at 26-29 (delay and high cost characterize
hearings).
182. See p. 747 supra.
183. See pp. 746-47 supra.
184. If influences other than performance under the criteria may be decisive, ap-
plicants may attempt to apply political pressure on the FCC or to bribe commissioners
by offers of future employment. See note 180 sulra.
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scales or absolute weights are used, or if the FCC secretly uses weights
or scales that it periodically alters,18 5 applicants in a comparative hear-
ing will have great difficulty in ascertaining what rankings will lead to
a license award. As a result, the applicants will be tempted to submit
tremendous amounts of detailed evidence in an effort to cover all pos-
sibilities. Hearing examiners, afraid of excluding possibly relevant
facts, will tend to accept almost all of the evidence submitted and allow
applicants to argue the importance of each fact. The elements of cost
and delay will be further exacerbated if axioms I, V, or IX are violated,
because then applicants can not safely limit themselves to arguing about
facts linked to the criteria. 80 The inability to predict what rankings
will lead to a license may tempt applicants to expend resources, not to
improve themselves, but to exert political pressure on the FCC or to
bribe FCC personnel by offering them future jobs with the applicant.8 7
2. Implications for Reform Proposals
In evaluating proposed reforms of the licensing process, a crucial
issue is which axiom the FCC should choose to violate, in order to
escape from the impossibility of satisfying all of them.18 8 There are two
routes that reform might take. First, some reforms retain a rational
decisionmaking procedure aimed at choosing applicants who will max-
imize social objectives. Reforms from this group must satisfy axioms I,
III, V, VII, VIII, and IX, which are rationality constraints, 89 in addi-
tion to satisfying the physical constraint inherent in axiom II. Axioms
IV and VI can be violated: an absolute weights or absolute scales
185. It is likely that one of these two possibilities holds because there is no apparent
set of rules that the FCC relies on to combine criteria into a choice. See note 171 suPra.
186. A violation of axiom VI through the adoption of a single criterion choice process
would reduce costs if the parties to comparative broadcast hearings knew that such a
process was in effect. If the parties knew, however, courts would probably also know and
would prevent the use of such a process.
187. See p. 750 & note 180 sup ra.
188. A large body of literature explores the process of deleting or changing public
choice axioms in response to the conclusion that a choice process cannot simultaneously
satisfy a set of axioms. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 2, at 419-22; Plott, supra note 107,
at 551-54.
189. If axiom I or VII is violated, the decision process is not based entirely on the
criteria meant to govern choices under the process. If axiom III is violated, then some
minimally qualified applicants cannot be considered in the choice process despite the
fact that they would be chosen if no other applicant were available. If axiom V is violated,
then either the process cannot form preferences between applicants on the basis of the
criteria that are supposed to govern the process or applicants may be chosen in direct
contradiction to the outcome dictated by the criteria. If axiom VIII is violated, then the
choice dictated by the criteria that govern the choice process may not be the actual
choice. If axiom IX is violated, then the choice process is arbitrary in the sense that
different applicants will be chosen in factually identical cases.
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method of combining criteria can be employed or the decision process
can be reduced to one that rests on a single criterion. Second, other
reforms abandon the rational decisionmaking procedure in favor of
a lottery or similar device not requiring evaluation by the FCC. If
this path is followed, axiom IX no longer constrains the choice pro-
cess. 190 Commentators have offered reform proposals that fit within
each of these two groups. The most commonly proposed reforms in-
clude, in the first group, an auction, "first come, first served," and
absolute weights or scales, and, in the second group, a lottery.
Several commentators have favored or considered use of an auc-
tion. 19' Applicants would be required to possess specified minimal
qualifications, and the highest minimally qualified bidder would be
awarded the license. Such a procedure employs the single criterion of
number of dollars bid, and thus violates axiom VI. "First come, first
served," a similar escape from the impossibility result, would award
each license to the first minimally qualified applicant to file an ap-
plication. Although criticized on grounds of general broadcast policy
and on the ground that programming regulation would be required, 9 2
such a system would avoid the impossibility result by using only the
single criterion of application speed. Finally, one commentator has
proposed that the licensing process rest in part on an absolute weights
190. The outcome in factually identical cases could be different because evaluation of
the facts under a set of criteria would not enter into the decision.
191. Even though they disagree about the desirable degree of continued government
regulation of broadcasting, some writers have suggested auctioning rights to broadcast.
See Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 23-24, 30-35 (1959)
(favoring auctioning rights to broadcast combined with minimal regulation); De Vany,
Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara & Scott, A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electro-
magnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1532-33,
1556-59 (1969) (advocating use of auction at least on experimental basis to allocate por-
tions of electromagnetic spectrum); Levin, supra note 180, at 22-23, 29-37 (favoring auction
as possibility in setting of continued government regulation and control). Other com-
mentators have considered an auction procedure, but have rejected it for various reasons.
See Anthony, supra note 70, at 99-102 (auction would be quick, cheap, and conclusive
but would result in abandoning public interest considerations in allocating broadcast
rights and would put premium on financial resources); Botein, supra note 171, at 759-61
(auction, although "administratively feasible and economically valid" would "abandon
any attempt at reaching a reasoned decision" based on public interest); Grunewald,
Should the Comparative Hearing Process Be Retained in Television Licensing? 13 Ae.
U.L. RFv. 164, 167-69 (1964) (auction would eliminate delays and possible improprieties in
present allocation process, but would lead to excessive commercialism and possibly to
concentration of ownership in hands of wealthy).
192. See Anthony, supra note 70, at 102-04 (first come, first served system would ignore
public interest considerations and would unfairly penalize careful preparation of ap-
plications; also, hard questions as to completeness of applications might arise); Grunewald,
supra note 191, at 168-69 (use of first come, first served system would require programming
regulation by FCC).
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and absolute scales approach. 93 Insofar as the process relied on that
approach, it would avoid the impossibility result by violating axiom IV.
Some commentators have considered use of a lottery to choose broad-
cast licensees from the pool of minimally qualified applicants. 94 The
adoption of a lottery would mean the abandonment of rational decision-
making in favor of allowing chance to dictate the result in any given
case.9 r9 As a consequence, the process would not have to conform to
axiom IX.
Many reform proposals, although attractive on the surface, will be
ineffective unless combined with measures that release the FCC from
one of the axioms. For example, at least one commentator has suggested
that granting longer tenure for commissioners and taking other steps
193. See Anthony, supra note 70, at 64-66. Anthony suggests that the FCC take four
steps to set up "a system of standards and priorities for choosing among mutually ex-
clusive applicants in broadcast licensing cases." Id. at 64. First, criteria must be selected
to evaluate applicants. Id. Second, the FCC should formulate "standards for awarding
applicants fixed credits under each of those" criteria. Id. Third, the Commission should
set up a "schedule of priority categories to rank the applicants on the basis of the credits
they earn." Id. In doing so, a "weighted point system may be helpful." Id. Finally, the
FCC should award each license to the applicant with the greatest number of total credits
with ties to be broken by lot. Id.
After setting out the four steps, Anthony provides a specific illustration of his type of
system. Id. at 64-65. In the illustration, diversification of control of mass media and past
broadcast record are the only criteria. Under the diversification criterion, the FCC awards
an applicant three points if the applicant has no substantial media interests, two points
for no substantial interest in nearby or national media, and zero points otherwise. Under
the past-broadcast-record criterion, an applicant earns four points for an outstanding
record, one point for a satisfactory record, and zero points otherwise. Each applicant's
points are totaled, and the applicant with the most points gets the license.
Such a system would violate axiom IV insofar as it relied upon an absolute-weights
system as in the illustration. In practice, a system like Anthony's proposal might function
as a lottery. Because broadcast rights are valuable, it would seem likely that several ap-
plicants, each with outstanding broadcast records and no substantial media interests, would
apply for each license. The highest level under each criterion would in effect become
a minimum standard, and the FCC would use a lottery as the core of its choice process.
194. See id. at 102 (lottery offers all benefits of auction-"speed, economy, objectivity,
and conclusiveness"; lottery avoids defects of auction except for lack of explicit public
interest considerations in choice of licensee); Botein, supra note 171, at 758-59 (lottery
might reduce administrative costs and potential corruption in present system but result
could be that "by concentrating on threshold qualifications .. . a lottery would just shift
the procedural locus of the comparative hearing's deficiencies" without any reduction in
either costs or potential corruption); Grunewald, supra note 191, at 169 (lottery system
could be used, thereby cutting costs and political influences on choices, but such system
might require programming regulation by FCC).
Judge Leventhal, in discussing reform of the comparative hearing, suggested that
"[p]erhaps a lottery could be used, for luck is not an inadmissible means of deciding the
undecidable." Star Television, Inc. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 888 (1969) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
195. One could visualize a lottery as a single criterion choice process that violates axiom
VI. The single criterion would be the outcome of the draw. Chance, however, seems to
have little to do with the public interest goal that underlies the comparative hearing
process.
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to attract more highly qualified commissioners might alleviate the de-
fects of the comparative hearing process. 9 ; An FCC composed of com-
missioners "dedicated to the public interest would be effective despite
structural deficiencies, possibly inconsistent duties, and vaguely defined
legislative standards."'' 9 T A proposal of this sort is rooted in a deeper
conception of the "New Deal" administrative agency. Well-trained
administrators will develop "expertise" in their agency's subject area.
When faced with a problem, these expert administrators will naturally
understand all of the complexities presented and then somehow will
combine all of the considerations into the "best" resolution of the
problem. 198 Yet, regardless of their quality or expertise, decisionmakers
who conduct the current FCC comparative hearing process must act in
a way that offends at least one implicit or explicit legal constraint. Im-
proving personnel will be futile since the process itself is internally
inconsistent.
Other reform proposals are similarly flawed. A former FCC hearing
examiner has urged that if the parties to each hearing proceeded with
fuller, clearer, and more concise reasoning, then "it may be fairly
assumed that the decisions, both initial and final, would likewise take
on a desired quality of logic and consistency."' 199 Judge Friendly sug-
gested in 1962 that the criteria in the FCC's MCCP be given better
definition by means of policy statements or rulemaking. 200 The FCC
issued its 1965 policy statement "to serve the purpose of clarity and
consistency of decision, and the further purpose of eliminating from
the hearing process time-consuming elements not substantially related
to the public interest."201 In that policy statement, the FCC reduced
the number of criteria to be considered and refined the elements to be
considered under each criterion.2 02 One commentator has urged direct
196. See Geller, supra note 179, at 720-24 (in order to secure higher quality commis-
sioners, they should have 15-year terms with no reappointment possible and should be
barred from employment in communications field for five years after FCC service).
197. Id. at 720-21.
198. See Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 1041, 1056-60 (1975) (criticizing and tracing development of expertise rationale).
199. Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 MINN. L. REv. 479,
498 (1959).
200. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 165, at 67-69; id. at 69 (policy statement with respect
to diversification criterion "would promote administrative consistency and intelligibility,
and also facilitate congressional action if Congress desired to act").
201. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 394.
202. Prior to the policy statement, the FCC commonly compared applicants under a
large number of criteria including local ownership, integration of ownership and manage-
ment, participation in civic activity, diversification of background of stockholders, length
of total past broadcast experience, record of past broadcast experience (including sense of
public service responsibility), proposed program policies, proposed staff and technical
facilities, and diversification of ownership of mass media. See Television Inquiry: Hear-
ings Pursuant to S. Res. 13 & 163 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
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steps to increase the efficiency of the hearing process: reducing the
classes of relevant evidence, limiting the hearings in time, and limiting
the amount of written evidence that will be considered. 20 3 Steps like
increasing the level of advocacy, refining the criteria, and attempting
to make hearings more efficient all stop short of remedying the basic
inconsistencies of the present comparative hearing process. More ef-
fective advocates, like more effective commissioners, cannot cure de-
fects that arise from the process itself. The refinement of the criteria
in the 1965 policy statement left the structure of the hearing process
fundamentally unchanged. 204 Attempts to improve the efficiency of the
system by limiting evidence that can be presented do not address the
basic problem: counsel will tend to submit a great deal of evidence
when faced with a process that allocates extremely valuable rights but
does not give a clear indication about the basis upon which decisions
will rest.205
3. Conclusions
Public choice theory can provide insight into administrative agency
decision processes. After expressing the physical and legal constraints
Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 979 (1956) (letter from George C. McConnaughey, FCC
Chairman); Irion, supra note 199, at 481. The 1965 policy statement reduced the number
of commonly used criteria to three or four. See pp. 734-36 supra. Only a reduction to
one criterion, however, would have ensured that the FCC could escape from the serious
consequences of the fact that no MCCP can simultaneously satisfy the nine axioms.
203. See Grunewald, supra note 191, at 178-80 (favoring expediting hearings by FCC
limitations on permissible evidence, on total time of hearing process, and on amount of
written material submitted; also favoring deletion of such unnecessary considerations as
staffing and signal strength).
204. WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 767 (1957), illustrates the ineffectiveness of the 1965 policy
statement. In 1954, the FCC began comparative hearings to grant the initial broadcast
license for television channel five in Boston to one of four minimally qualified applicants.
After weighing and balancing rankings under 13 different criteria, see id. at 859-81, the
Commission selected a winner, WHDH. The choice process was slow, turbid, and unpre-
dictable. Because the Commission later discovered that representatives of WHDH had
attempted to influence the FCC Chairman improperly while the comparative hearings
were in progress, WHDH's grant was voided. See WHDH, Inc., 29 F.C.C. 204, 212-13
(1960). Three competing applicants challenged WHDH at renewal time and, due to
various delays, the Commission's final decision was not rendered until 1969. WHDH,
Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969). Because the FCC treated the renewal hearing as if it were an
initial licensing hearing under the 1965 policy statement, see id. at 7-8, a scholar can com-
pare the initial disposition of channel five before and after the policy statement. This
comparison shows that the 1969 decision was only slightly more acceptable than the 1957
decision. When the 1969 hearings compared the four applicants under only four cate-
gories, see id. at 10-17, one applicant ranked no lower than any other applicant under
every criterion and thus was awarded the license. Unfortunately, the relationship between
the evidence and the rankings was not obvious-the hearing examiner had chosen a
different licensee on the same facts. Id. at 8-10, 19. If the ultimate winner had not been
preferred under every criterion, the Commission would have had to engage in the same
unsatisfactory weighing and balancing process that characterized pre-1965 decisions. In
addition, of course, the decision process remained very slow.
205. See pp. 750-51 & note 181 supra.
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on an agency as axioms, one can test a decision process for internal
consistency. A finding of inconsistency is valuable for two reasons.
First, forcing litigants and public servants to operate within an in-
ternally inconsistent system has heavy costs. Even the most able and
idealistic administrators will be frustrated when their best efforts must
result in a violation of a principle that they accept or are constrained
to obey. Resources are wasted and risks of corruption or illicit influence
arise when lawyers and parties have to work within an inconsistent
system. If the faulty system is an adjudicative mechanism, its continued
failure to live up to the constraints placed on it may undermine public
confidence not only in the mechanism, but also in law and government
themselves. In addition to helping to detect internal inconsistency in
agency decision processes, public choice theory also helps to separate
useful reform efforts from those that are doomed to failure. A success-
ful reform effort must lead to a relaxation of one of the axiomatic con-
straints that leads to inconsistency. Otherwise, even well-intentioned
proposals will be ineffective.
III. The Use of Internally Inconsistent Multicriteria Choice Pro-
cesses by Courts
Like administrative agencies, courts sometimes use MCCPs. These
MCCPs may be required by statute20 6 or they may be created inde-
206. Federal law dealing with bank mergers, for example, establishes an MCCP for
determining the legality of anticompetitive mergers. The statute provides that the respon-
sible agency shall not approve a bank merger that will substantially reduce competition or
cause a restraint of trade "unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the
transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served." 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1976). The section further provides that "[i]n every case, the
responsible agency shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources
and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and
needs of the community to be served." Id. The statute therefore provides several criteria
under which the agency is to reach a decision.
In United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967), the Supreme Court con-
sidered the role of courts in reviewing bank merger decisions by the responsible agency.
Id. at 367-70. Federal law provides that "the standards applied by the court" in such
cases "shall be identical with" those that the responsible agency must apply. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c)(7)(B) (1976). In addition, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1976) requires the court to
"review de novo the issue presented" in bank merger cases. In First City National Bank
the Court held that under these provisions courts should make an "independent de-
termination of the issues," which need not give any weight to the agency determination.
386 U.S. at 368. As a result, it is "[t]he task of the district courts . . . to inquire de novo
into the validity of a bank merger" to determine "whether the merger offended the anti-
trust laws and ... if it did, whether the banks had established that the merger was none-
theless justified by the convenience and needs of the community to be served." United
States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 178 (1968). Thus, courts must evaluate the con-
venience and needs defense under the statutory MCCP.
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pendently by the courts themselves..2 07 There are a number of ways in
which one might apply public choice analyses to judicial decision-
making.208 This section focuses on the task of analyzing judicial choice
processes using the possibility theorem developed previously.209
Violations of some of the axioms by courts would be highly signif-
icant. For example, if it were known that all the axioms but axiom V
were satisfied, then either the judiciary would not be able to distinguish
between alternatives on the basis of the criteria it claims to use or there
would be a possibility that the judiciary was choosing inferior al-
ternatives.2 10 Either situation would be extremely serious for an in-
stitution that derives its legitimacy in a democracy from a reliance on
principled decisionmaking. 21 It is generally much more difficult, how-
ever, to apply the possibility theorem to the judicial process. Because
of the nature of the process, courts reveal less of their decisionmaking
process than do administrative agencies.21 2 Thus, it may be quite dif-
207. One example is the way in which courts decide the state of corporate citizenship
in diversity jurisdiction cases. Under the Constitution, "[t]he judicial Power shall extend
.. to Controversies .. .between Citizens of different States." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
If any civil action over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction is filed in
state courts, it "may be removed by the defendant ... to the district court of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976). When a defendant corporation seeks to remove a state
court action under diversity of citizenship, the corporation's state "citizenship" is a crucial
issue. Because federal statutes equate citizenship with the corporation's "principal place
of business," id. § 1332(c), courts must choose one principal state of business from a set
of mutually exclusive alternatives. Courts appear to use an MCCP to make this determina-
tion. See Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960) (ranking
states and deciding principal place of business under criteria that include location of
administrative officers, location of corporate employees, location of tangible property, and
location of productive capacity).
208. For example, Levine & Plott, supra note 5, at 563, 592-96, suggests that models of
voting behavior can be used to illuminate the agenda influences inherent in the rendering
of special verdicts by courts.
209. The axioms used here are only one of many possible sets of axioms. Because this
set includes axiom I-which requires that there be at least three potential choices-it
can only produce interesting conclusions concerning judicial decisions involving at least
three possible outcomes. Compare note 206 supra (bank merger law allows only two out-
comes) with note 218 infra (many possible outcomes in procedural due process cases).
210. See pp. 722-23 supra (stating and discussing axiom V).
211. Administrative agencies are subject to the legal requirement of "reasoned decision-
making." See p. 738 supra. Although courts are not subject to a similar legal require-
ment, and although for the highest level of appellate courts there is no formal in-
stitution to oversee the quality of decisionmaking, many scholars have argued that courts
derive their legitimacy in a democratic society from basing decisions upon principle. See,
e.g., A. BicKEL, THE LEASr DANGEROUS BRANCH 205-06, 238-40 (1962); Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15, 19 (1959) (judicial judg-
ments must not be ad hoc and merely political, but based on principles that both
transcend given case and require particular result).
212. A court is limited to deciding the cases before it. Although it can enunciate
general standards and principles in any given case, it cannot comprehensively detail its
decisionmaking process in a particular area of law by a device like the FCC's 1965 policy
statement. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968) (dictum) (constitutional
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ficult to discern from judicial opinions whether particular axioms are
satisfied or, indeed, whether an MCCP is used at all. Moreover, even
when the possibility theorem can be applied, violations of some of the
axioms have different implications for courts than for administrative
agencies.
A. Difficulties in Deciding Whether an MCCP is Used and Whether
the Nine Axioms Apply-An Illustrative Example
This discussion uses procedural due process cases to illustrate the
difficulties inherent in ascertaining whether courts use an MCCP and
whether certain of the nine axioms apply.
1. Procedural Due Process-Is an MCCP Used?
Currently, courts examine three criteria to determine what pro-
cedures are constitutionally required before the government takes an
action harming a person or denying him a valuable benefit:2 13 the
private interest affected, the risk of error, and the government's in-
terests. 214 This test was set out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge,215 and has been repeatedly used by the Court in procedural
due process cases. 216
The definition of an MCCP includes three aspects: specifying a
finite number of criteria for evaluating alternatives, ranking the al-
restriction of federal jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies" bars federal judiciary
from issuing advisory opinions); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (federal
judicial power is limited to "the right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants"). Furthermore, an administrative agency often deals with a single
problem over a long period of time while courts spend much of their time dealing with
new, unresolved problems. See pp. 763-64 infra (litigators will not tend to raise issues that
are resolved and courts can dispose of such issues summarily when raised). Even though
a court can enunciate general principles in a particular case, it is often reluctant to do so
until there is a body of related case law. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 1267, 1301-02 (1975) (comprehensive prescription of procedures required by
due process in certain types of cases amounts to unwise judicial legislation; it is best to
allow slow evolution of requirements through case law). By that time, however, a court
may be able to impose a clear solution; it may be able to establish an MCCP with
clearly established weights for various criteria.
213. The determination of the procedures that are necessary follows the determination
that a plaintiff has an interest in "life, liberty or property" that falls within the due
process clause. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. If he does not have such an interest, then the
government need not make available any particular procedure. See Note, Specifying the
Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing,
88 HARV. L. REv. 1510, 1510 (1975).
214. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-15 (1977) (procedures required before
suspension of driver's license); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-82 (1977) (procedures
provided by public school before corporal punishment permitted).
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ternatives under each criterion, and combining the rankings into a
choice.217 In a procedural due process case, it is plausible to assume that
alternative procedures are ranked by judges under each of the three
Mathews criteria. At least in some cases, however, a court will be faced
with a large number of possible procedures that are minimally accept-
able.218 It may be nearly impossible tQ rank all of the possibilities under
each criterion. If courts use an MCCP in such a context, they must do
so by limiting consideration to a few candidates. 219 But, if the initial
winnowing process is too restrictive, only one candidate will remain and
it will not be necessary to apply an MCCP. Thus, the argument that
courts rank alternatives to decide what process is due depends on rather
delicate assumptions about the existence and strength of this winnow-
ing process.220
Failure to rank alternatives under the criteria is only one way in
which a judicial decisionmaking process can fail to conform to the
definition of an MCCP. The other major way is failure to use criteria
at all. This discussion is limited, however, to situations in which courts
explicitly employ a set of criteria to evaluate alternatives.
2. Difficulties in Determining Whether Axioms I and 11 Apply
A threshold issue that arises in applying the possibility theorem to
a judicial MCCP is whether there are at least three alternatives, each
of which would be chosen if no other alternatives were available. If not,
then axiom II, which is a merely technical requirement, will not be
satisfied. 22 1 As a result, one will not be able to say on the basis of the
possibility theorem that one of the more interesting axioms must be
violated. Many cases have only two outcomes; sometimes, for example,
the question may be only whether or not a particular procedure is
adequate.
217. See p. 719 supra.
218. There may be many possible combinations of procedural elements that could be
required in a given case. See Friendly, supra note 212, at 1279-95 (listing 11 elements).
Within some of the elements there may be many gradations. Thus, even when only a few
procedural elements are under consideration, there may still be many possible combina-
tions.
219. In FCC comparative hearings, the number of candidates is limited both by the
number that apply and by the FCC's own initial winnowing process, which excludes
candidates that do not possess certain minimal qualifications. See pp. 733-34 suPra.
220. In FCC comparative hearings, the number of candidates that must be considered
is limited by the number of applicants. A parallel limitation in procedural due process
cases-might be that courts will only consider the parties' own proposed candidates for
a minimally required set of procedures. Placing such attention on issues raised by the
parties, however, could lead to a "yes-no" type of decision with respect to each procedural
element put at issue by the parties. Such a series of decisions would violate axiom II.
See pp. 760-61 infra.
221. See p. 721 sutra (stating and discussing axiom II).
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For axiom II to be satisfied in the procedural due process cases, the
decisionmaking process must go beyond a mere "yes-no" determina-
tion of whether particular procedures meet minimal constitutional
standards. In order to avoid the problem, it is necessary to make as-
sumptions about the hidden mechanics of judicial decisionmaking. One
might assume that courts determine what minimal process is due, after
considering many possible candidates, before they compare the actual
process afforded with what is due. This assumption would avoid the
threshold problem of axiom II.
It is difficult to tell from the case law whether the assumption holds.
When existing procedures are found to be adequate, there is no reason
to specify the minimal requirements or, in some cases, even to consider
them. In practice, courts usually do not specify the constitutional
minimum in such cases. 222 However, when courts find existing pro-
cedures inadequate, they usually do set out a minimal set of required
procedures.223 Yet even when they do so, courts may limit themselves
to a series of "yes-no" decisions about the need for particular procedural
elements. Commentators are sharply divided about whether courts
should be comprehensive in specifying what procedure is required.224
If no comprehensive specification is provided, decisionmaking by a
series of "yes-no" determinations with respect to each procedural ele-
ment sought by a party would seem at least as likely as decisionmaking
that first defined, in a single step, a comprehensive, minimally required
process. 225 A series of "yes-no" determinations would constitute a set
222. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 855-56 (1977)
(finding procedures adequate for transferring foster child to new foster parents); Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-82 -1977) (finding procedures preceding administration of
corporal punishment in public school adequate). But see Board of Curators v. Horowitz,
98 S. Ct. 948, 959-62 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (attacking majority
dictum that procedural due process would have been satisfied by less procedural protection
than provided; Mathews test mandated all procedural protection actually provided).
223. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-84 (1975) (requiring notice and informal
hearing before short suspension from public school); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
266-71 (1970) (requiring extensive procedural protection before deprivation of welfare
payments).
224. Compare Friendly, supra note 212, at 1301-02 (comprehensive prescription of
procedures required amounts to unwise judicial legislation; it is best to allow slow
evolution of requirements through case law) with Note, supra note 213, at 1520-21 (to
avoid uncertainty, court should always articulate set of procedures to govern not only
"case before it" but also "broad range of similar cases").
225. In at least one recent opinion, the Supreme Court undertakes a series of "yes-no"
determinations with respect to procedural elements that could be required. See Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 850-55 (1977). It is unclear, however, whether
this series of arguments represents judicial thought processes. In addition, even if the
Smith case was decided by a series of "yes-no" determinations, it may be that other cases
are decided by a single-step determination of a comprehensive, minimally required set of
procedures.
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of decisions, each of which violated axiom II. In any event, procedural
due process opinions do not provide enough insight into the decision-
making processes of judges to determine whether or not axiom II
applies.
A related problem is that there may be no single minimally required
set of procedural rights. Some procedural elements may be traded off
against others to yield equivalent packages of rights. For indigent
plaintiffs in welfare or disability cases whose benefits have been
temporarily suspended pending pursuit of formal remedies, for ex-
ample, the right to counsel without the right to confront adverse wit-
nesses may be roughly equivalent to the right to confront witnesses
without any right to counsel. If there are groups of equivalent pack-
ages of procedural rights, axiom I's requirement that the MCCP
choose one alternative may be violated.2 26
One might assume that judges merely arrive at a class of equivalent
procedures, but there is no support for this assumption in actual
opinions. Indeed, in many cases, courts have specified a single pro-
cedural package as the constitutional minimum.2 2 7 It seems more likely
that judges see their task as one of discovering such a single minimum
procedure. But there remains a significant possibility that their deci-
sionmaking violates axiom I because they could easily choose any of
several constitutionally equivalent outcomes. 228
3. Applicability of Axioms IlI-IX
Axioms III, V, VII, VIII, and IX seem to be desirable traits of the
judicial process: courts should be able to consider any potential al-
ternative; they should be able to determine whether one alternative is
more desirable, less desirable, or equally desirable to another; they
should choose a more desirable alternative over one that is less desir-
able; the order or "agenda" in which alternatives are considered should
226. Perhaps with this problem in mind. Judge Friendly has produced a list of ele-
ments of procedural protection in decreasing order of priority. See Friendly, supra note
212, at 1278-95. Judge Friendly's purpose in producing such a list, as well as a correspond-
ing list ranking the severity of various government actions, was that such lists "may help
to produce more principled and predictable decisions" than does the bare requirement
that private and government interests be balanced against each other. Id. at 1278. But
Friendly also observed that some protections can be traded off against others to obtain a
similar amount of overall protection. See id. at 1279 ("the elements of a fair hearing
should not be considered separately; if an agency chooses to go further than is constitu-
tionally demanded with respect to one item, this may afford good reason for diminishing
or even eliminating another").
227. See note 223 suPra (citing cases).
228. Axiom I, like axiom II, is a technical axiom. Violation of axiom I prevents a
demonstration that, on the basis of the possibility theorem, an MCCP violates at least one
of the more interesting axioms. See p. 759 supra.
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not affect the outcome; an alternative should not be chosen if there is
another one that is superior under every criterion; and "irrelevant"
criteria should not affect the choice.229 Although these axioms cannot
be said to be legal constraints analogous to the requirement of "rea-
soned decisionmaking" that is imposed on administrative agencies,230
courts derive their legitimacy in a democracy from grounding their
decisions on principle.23 1 It is therefore reasonable to view axioms III,
V, VII, VIII, and IX as constraints on any judicial MCCP.
In the procedural due process cases, there is evidence that axioms IV
and VI apply. Both the Supreme Court and commentators have in-
dicated that no one criterion is so overwhelmingly important that it
would determine the outcome in every case,23 2 so axiom VI appears to
be satisfied. In fact, reform proposals often focus on changing from an
MCCP to a single criterion choice process even if the single criterion
itself is somewhat ill-defined.233 Commentators have also noted that
the process of "balancing" the criteria seems to be inherently subjective
and that the criteria themselves seem to be incommensurable.23 4 Thus,
axiom IV appears to be satisfied.
B. The Implications of Judicial Violation of Some of the Axioms
Violation of at least two of the axioms might be acceptable in a
judicial setting. One might have no objection to a court decision that
229. See pp. 721-24 supra (stating and explaining axioms III, V, VII, VIII, and IX).
230. See pp. 739-44 supra (all nine axioms apply to FCC comparative hearings as
physical constraints, explicit legal constraints, or implicit legal constraints).
231. See note 211 suPra.
232. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (government interest in
minimizing fiscal and administrative burdens on agencies "is a factor that must be
weighed" but not "a controlling weight" by itself); Lawrence, A Restatement of the
Roth-Fuentes Analysis of Procedural Due Process, 11 GA. L. Rav. 477, 502-04 (1977)
(Mathews downplayed but did not eliminate government interest as factor and shifted
greater emphasis to individual interest).
233. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 232, at 507 (proposing that single test of "fairness"
to private individuals affected by government action replace present MCCP in determina-
tion of form of hearing required by procedural due process); Note, supra note 213, at
1539-42 (single concept of procedural fairness and decency should govern decision as to
what process is due rather than group of factors under interest-balancing test).
234. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 212, at 1278 (test in procedural due process cases
consisting of balancing government interests against individual interests is "uncertain and
subjective"); Note, supra note 213, at 1519-20 ("[n]o scale has been calibrated" that permits
courts and administrators "to sensitively and predictably measure either the relative
severity of deprivations inflicted upon individuals or the relative importance of govern-
mental interests in summary action" and even if weights of government interest and
private interest "can somehow be accurately measured in isolation from [each] other,"
there is "no method" by which they could "be compared"; result of having to compare




violated axiom IV by announcing openly an absolute scale for com-
bining various criteria, or violated axiom VI by announcing a single-
criterion test. In addition, although a secret violation of axiom VI ap-
pears unacceptable in the judicial context, there may be situations in
which a court's covert violation of the axiom, unlike a similar action
by an administrative agency, would not be totally unreasonable.
Such a secret violation of axiom IV might be only mildly objection-
able when a court faces a complex issue. In such a case, there may be
some agreement about the factors that should be considered in deciding
the issue, but there may not be enough knowledge or agreement to es-
tablish a wise, comprehensive, and systematic solution that will govern
future cases. It would then be understandable for a court to enunciate
decision criteria without announcing any absolute weights or scales for
combining rankings under the criteria.23, By announcing the relevant
criteria, the court can encourage counsel to concentrate on the appro-
priate facts in future cases, while, at the same time, avoiding problems
that might arise from the premature creation of rules for combining
the various criteria into a choice. Later repudiation of prematurely
fixed rules would weaken the reputation of the judiciary as a prin-
cipled, nonlegislative decisionmaking institution20-' and would harm
those who had relied on the previous rules.237
The policy formulation situation just described can occur in an ad-
ministrative agency as well as in a judicial setting. Some agencies go
through a period when they learn how to ascertain what policies and
decisions are in the public interest.2 3s That period, however, is meant
to be of limited duration, and agencies that have been addressing the
same problems for decades can be expected to use processes that violate
235. Many scholars and judges agree that a court should not lay down general rules
or guidelines when these are not necessary to decide the case before the court. See, e.g.,
Friendly, supra note 212, at 1301-02 (courts perceive case at hand but not total spectrum
of cases that could arise; general rules unnecessarily established by court to decide case
may have unintended and undesirable consequences); cf. A. BICKEL, supra note 211, at 238-
40 (legitimacy of Supreme Court rests on ability of Court to make principled decisions that
command widespread acceptance; "[t]he first wisdom" is to defer decision until Court has
enough experience to render judgment that will command such acceptance).
236. See notes 211, 212 & 235 supra.
Prolonged operation without the formulation of general rules may also weaken respect
for the judiciary. But, in some cases, the premature imposition of rules may be even more
detrimental.
237. When an area of law is unsettled and courts are not using even unannounced
absolute weights or scales, another type of violation may occur. If one views the principles
of res judicata and stare decisis as constraining an MCCP to be consistent over time, then
axiom IX must apply to cases that are separated in time. Yet, if the rules for combining
outcomes under different criteria are in flux, it may be that there is no guarantee that
the same case will be decided the same way on two different occasions.
238. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 165, at 12-14; Freedman, supra note 198, at 1072.
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axiom IV only in a principled and explicit manner, if at all.2 39 On the
other hand, courts are constantly required to spend a great deal of time
on new, unresolved problems. Litigants will tend not to raise issues that
are already clearly resolved, and courts can deal with such issues by
summary references to precedent or statute when they do arise. Policy
formulation situations can thus be expected to be quite common for
courts and somewhat less common for mature administrative agencies.
Conclusion
Public choice theory can be used to probe the mechanics of adjudica-
tion, as well as to analyze voting. The theorem developed here is most
usefully applied to tribunals, like administrative agencies, that deal
with the same problem continually and are subject to the requirement
that their controlling principles of decision be both explicit and
reasonable. Although public choice theory cannot eliminate the need
to make vexing allocative decisions, such as deciding who shall be
admitted to medical school or who shall be given broadcasting licenses,
it can point the way toward reforms of our decisionmaking processes
that will make those choices more rational and consistent.
239. See In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant,
Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F.C.C.2d 419 (1977) (discussing
possibility of using quantitative guidelines in comparative hearings); H. FRIENDLY, sukra
note 165, at 14 (when initial standard is general so that agency can set policy on basis of
experience, "it is imperative that steps be taken over the years to define and clarify it";
process of definition and clarification should be "carried to the point of affording a fair
degree of predictability of decision in the great majority of cases and of intelligibility in
all").
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Appendix A: Overview of the Proof of Internal Inconsistency and its
Relation to Previous Work in Public Choice Theory240
Arrow's general possibility theorem241 demonstrates that individual pref-
erences cannot be combined to choose a social policy if the choice process
must meet certain conditions. The proof that an MCCP cannot simul-
taneously conform to the nine axioms presented in the text 242 relies, ulti-
mately, on Arrow's theorem. That theorem assumes that each individual's
preferences form an "ordering." An ordering is a relation between alter-
natives that is "complete," "transitive," and "reflexive." 2 43 "Complete"
means that the relation can compare any two alternatives and indicate
that one is preferred to another or that there is indifference between
them. Completeness is, by definition, a feature of an MCCP because such
a process "ranks" the alternatives under each criterion.2 44
An ordering is transitive if the following is true for rankings under a
given criterion: where alternative A is at least as good as alternative B,
and alternative B is at least as good as alternative C, alternative A is at
least as good as alternative C. This property also follows from the as-
sumption that in an MCCP alternatives are ranked under each criterion.
For example, if A is ranked third and therefore is preferred to B, who is
ranked fifth, and B is preferred to C, who is ranked sixth, then A is
preferred to C. Setting up a ranking under each criterion precludes the
possibility of intransitivity under any given criterion.2 45
Finally, a relation is reflexive if it applies when an alternative is con-
sidered against itself. For example, if the relation were "at least as good
as," then it would be reflexive since an alternative is at least as good as
itself under any criterion. Since the analysis has not ruled out ties be-
tween alternatives under any given criterion, the relation under consid-
eration must be of the form "is at least as good as" in order to satisfy the
reflexivity condition.2 46
240. This appendix links the technical demonstration that the nine axioms cannot
simultaneously apply to an MCCP to previous results in public choice theory. The ap-
pendix is meant both for the general reader who wishes to know what that link is and
for the reader who desires to have a "roadmap" to the proofs in Appendix C.
241. The original version of the theorem and its original proof can be found in K.
ARRow, supra note I, at 46-60. A version of the theorem and its proof that is accessible
to the general reader appears in A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37-46.
242. See pp. 720-25 supra.
243. The term "ordering" is not always used to describe a relation that has the three
qualities of completeness, transitivity, and reflexivity. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 9. Those
three qualities, however, are assumed to be qualities of the individual preferences con-
sidered in the general possibility theorem. See id. at 37.
244. See p. 719 supra.
245. Even though rankings under each criterion are transitive, the overall choice
process may not be. For example, in the choice process discussed at pp. 723-24 supra,
there are rankings and therefore transitivity under each criterion, but the choice process
as a whole is not transitive. Although A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, C is
preferred to A. See id.
246. The relation "is at least as good as" still permits one to form a strict ranking. If
the relation holds as to A against B but not as to B against A, then A is strictly preferred
to B since A is at least as good as B but B is not at least as good as A.
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In addition to these three conditions on the rankings under the criteria,
Arrow's general possibility theorem imposes four major conditions on a
choice process. First, the choice process must be able to operate for any
particular ordering of the alternatives under the criteria.247 This condi-
tion is reflected in axiom 111.248 If a potential candidate with any conceiv-
able set of characteristics can be considered in the choice process, then
the choice process must be able to operate for any conceivable set of
rankings that could arise. Second, the choice process must conform to
the "weak Pareto principle." 249 This principle requires that if one al-
ternative is preferred to a second one under every criterion, then the
first alternative must be preferred in the choice process. This principle
is equivalent to axiom VIII, which states that an alternative will not be
chosen when there is another available alternative that is superior to the
first one under every criterion.250 Third, Arrow's theorem uses the "con-
dition of nondictatorship." 251 In the context of the aggregation of indi-
vidual preferences, this condition requires that social choices not always
conform to any one individual's preferences. 25 2 In this article, "nondictator-
ship" is imposed by axiom VI's requirement that the outcome under any
single criterion not always determine the outcome of the choice process.25 '.
The remaining condition of Arrow's theorem is "independence of irrele-
vant alternatives. '254 This condition requires both that the choice among
a fixed set of alternatives depend only on the ordinal rankings of those
alternatives under the given criteria and that the addition of other alterna-
tives in the comparison not change the rankings of the original choices.2 55
As an example, consider a choice among four candidates, W, X, Y, and
Z, under seven criteria.2 56 Suppose that the choice process operates first
by assigning each candidate one point for the lowest ranking under a
criterion, two points for the second ranking, and so on up to the highest
ranking, and then by choosing the candidate with the highest total num-
ber of points over all the criteria. Consider the following set of rankings:
Criterion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ranking
First W X Y W X Y W
Second X Y Z X Y Z X
Third Y Z W Y Z W Y
Fourth Z W X Z W X Z
247. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37.
248. See p. 721 supra.
249. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37.
250. See pp. 724-25 supra.
251. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 38.
252. See id.
253. See p. 743 supra.
254. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37.
255. See id. at 37-38.




When all four candidates are considered, Y will be chosen, but if Z is not
included in the pool of applicants under consideration, W will be the
winner and Y will fall back to third in total points. In fact, V, X, and Y
will rank exactly opposite in total points:
Total Points





The outcome of the choice process between W, X, and Y depends on
whether Z is also considered. The process therefore violates the condition
of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Unfortunately, difficulties with the independence-of-irrelevant-alterna-
tives axiom preclude the direct application of Arrow's theorem to judicial
and administrative decisionmaking processes. First, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether MCCPs violate the condition. In order to make such a
determination, one would either have to be considering a precisely speci-
fied choice process, such as in the example presented above, or one would
need to have empirical or descriptive information about the effect of
excluding certain alternatives from consideration. Many interesting MCCPs
are not precisely defined,2 57 and most attempts to determine the effect of
excluding certain alternatives from consideration would involve hypo-
thetical speculation. Finally, even if violations of the condition of in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives were easy to detect, the condition's
legal and normative implications are not as meaningful or interesting as
the implications of the axioms that replace it.25a
Arrow's general possibility theorem holds that not all of the conditions
in his theorem can be satisfied by a choice process simultaneously. 259 Ap-
pendices B and C link the nine textual axioms to the conditions of the
theorem. Appendix B lists technical axioms that follow directly from the
textual axioms. 2" 0 Appendix C consists of two parts. First, the condition
of independence of irrelevant alternatives is derived from some of the
technical axioms. 2 1 The technical axioms provide all of the additional
conditions necessary for Arrow's theorem.262 The second half of Appendix
257. See, e.g., p. 727 supra (Harvard program does not specify explicitly how con-
siderations under various criteria are combined to make choices between applicants);
p. 736 supra (FCC does not give clear indication about how rankings under criteria are
combined to choose single candidate from among many applicants for broadcast license).
258. For example, axiom IX can be related to the requirement that a court or agency
adhere to precedent. See p. 744 supra.
259. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37-38.
260. See pp. 768-72 infra.
261. This derivation is accomplished by proving Lemmas 1-3. Lemma 3 is the condition
of independence of irrelevant alternatives. See pp. 772-76 infra; A. SEN, supra note 3. at
41 (stating condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in form similar to Lemma
3).
262. See pp. 765-66 supra.
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C proves Arrow's theorem.263 Because the theorem holds that not all of
the conditions can be satisfied simultaneously, and because the nine
textual axioms imply all of Arrow's conditions, every MCCP must violate
at least one of the nine textual axioms.
Appendix B. Translation of Roman Numeral Axioms into Arabic
Number Axioms Used in Proofs in Appendix C.
In this appendix, the roman numeral axioms are transformed into an
equivalent set of arabic number axioms, that are then employed in Ap-
pendix C to prove that the nine axioms presented in text cannot be
simultaneously satisfied by an MCCP. All of the arabic number axioms
are either direct "translations" of a roman numeral axiom into more
formal terminology or axioms that are implied by a roman numeral axiom.
This appendix presents each arabic numbered axiom and then explains
the link between that axiom and the corresponding roman numeral axiom.
Before proceeding with the arabic numbered axioms a few definitions
need to be provided: 26 4
E = the set of all potential alternatives 263
v = a subset of E
N = a set of n criteria, ci, i = 1, 2 ...... n
U = the set of all real-valued functions on E X N
Given a, b e v; u e U, u(a, c1) >_ u(b, ci) means a is at least as good as
b under criterion i.
1. Axiom 1:3 C(v, u), a single-valued choice function, which depends
on v, the set of alternatives under consideration, and on the numbers
assigned to each alternative under each criterion by the function u.
263. See pp. 776-78 infra.
264. It is assumed in this appendix and in Appendix C that the reader is familiar
with elementary logical and mathematical symbols. For readers who do not have such
familiarity, the commonly used symbols and their meanings are as follows:
- it is not the case that
3 - there exist(s)
V - for all
- is a member of
> - greater than
> - greater than or equal to
A CB - set A is contained in set B
n
UCI - the union of sets C1,0C, ..., and Cn
i=1
IE - the number of elements in the set E
s.t. - such that
- such that
==> - implies
- if and only if
265. "Potential alternatives" here is meant in the sense of axiom 2 in this appendix,
see p. 769 infra. A "potential alternative" is one that will be chosen if no other al-
ternative is available.
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This axiom is equivalent to axiom I in the text.266 Both axioms specify
that the MCCP chooses a single alternative from the set of alternatives
under consideration.
2. Axiom 2: 1 E I - 3. In addition, Vui e U, C (a, ul) = a Va e E.
The first part of this axiom states that E, the set of potential alterna-
tives, contains at least three members. This part of axiom 2 is simply a
technical statement of axiom II in text.267
The second part of axiom 2 follows from the definition of potential
alternatives as those that will be selected if there are no other alternatives
under consideration.
3. Axiom 3: C (v, ul) is defined Vv, Vu' e U.
Axiom 3 states that regardless of the set of numbers assigned to the
alternatives by the function u l, which establishes rankings under various
criteria, the choice function will generate an "answer" when possible
choices are limited to any subset, v, of the set of all potential alternatives.
The axiom does not specify the form of the "answer." It may be that no
choice or more than one alternative is the "answer." Other axioms such
as axioms 1 and 2 put restrictions on what the answer can be.268
Axiom 3 follows directly from axiom III in text. 269 Axiom III states
that the choice process can consider any potential alternative regardless of
the particular characteristics it possesses.27 0 But axiom 3 states only that the
choice function is defined for any subset, v, of the set E of all potential
alternatives.
4. Axiom 4: For every ul, u2 e U, Vv CE, if 3 n + 1 numbers a, 31 > 0,
32 > 0, ..... /3> 0 such that Vc e N, and Va e E, ul(a, cl) = a + 8,u2(a, c1)
then C(v, ul) = C(v, u2).
This axiom states that if the numbers used to represent a ranking within
any one criterion are rescaled by a "positive linear transformation" con-
sisting of multiplying the original numbers by some positive number or
of adding the same number to each of the numbers or both, there will
be no change in the outcome of the choice function over any set of po-
tential alternatives, v. For example, suppose that a composite MCAT
score is one of the criteria for making decisions between candidates for
admission to medical school. If axiom 4 applies, the choice will be un-
affected if the MCAT scores are rescaled by a positive linear transforma-
tion. In other words, the choice will not depend on whether the original
MCAT score is used or each MCAT score is multiplied by the same posi-
tive number, 3, and then increased by the same number, az.
This arabic numbered axiom follows from axiom IV in text.2 7 Axiom
IV allows "quarternary comparisons" between the degree of preference
266. See pp. 720-21 supra.
267. See p. 721 supra.
268. See pp. 768-69 supra.
269. See p. 721 supra.
270. See id.
271. See pp. 721-22 supra.
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under any single criterion. Thus one can make a comparison like "alter-
native a is preferred to alternative b under criterion two by five times as
much as alternative c is preferred to alternative d under the same cri-
terion." What axiom IV does not permit is a process that combines such
comparisons into a choice by using a set of absolute weights, 272 by trans-
lating each comparison onto a single absolute scale, 273 or by assigning
importance to a criterion not on the sole basis of the relative size of pref-
erences under the criterion but by reference to the score on an absolute
scale. 274 If axiom IV holds, then the choice will be unaffected if the num-
bers representing the ranking under any criterion are rescaled by a positive
linear transformation since the size of preferences under one criterion will
not be linked to the size of preferences under any other criterion by ab-
solute weights or by a common scale. Only the relative size of preferences
under any criterion, as opposed to some absolute score for the criterion,
will affect the choice.
5. Axiom 5: D a complete binary relation, R, that rationalizes C. (A re-
lation, R, rationalizes a choice function if Vv e E, C(v) = (x e v: Vy e v,
xRy); R can be thought of as "is at least as desirable an alternative as.")
The first part of axiom 5, stating that there exists a complete binary
relation, is merely a technical statement of the first half of axiom V in
text. 275 The existence of a complete binary relation means that between
272. Suppose that a medical school admits students on the basis of two criteria: a
0 to 100 score on an aptitude test and a 0 to 4 college grade point average. Assume the
school uses absolute weights to combine the two criteria by adding 25 times grade point
average to the aptitude scores and choosing the candidate with the highest aggregate
score. If the school were to scale down the aptitude test scores by dividing them by
100, greater prominence would be placed on grade point average so that some choices
between possible candidates would be changed. Specifically, after the "scaling down,"
a 0.04 difference in grade point average would compensate for a 100-point difference
in test score while previously a 0.04 difference in grade point average would only have
compensated for a one-point change in test score.
273. Translating each comparison onto a single absolute scale is equivalent to using
absolute weights. By using absolute weights, differences in scores under different criteria
become directly comparable. The weights translate the point differences under one cri-
terion into equivalent point differences under others. One could choose the scale of
quarternary comparison units under any one criterion and use the weights to translate
differences under any other criterion into units of that scale. The net result would be
a common absolute scale.
274. Suppose that academic potential is one of the criteria for admission to medical
school and that aptitude test scores are used to rank applicants under that criterion.
If the absolute difference between candidates' scores has significance for the importance
of the criterion, then rescaling the aptitude test scores might affect whether or not a
particular applicant is chosen. On the other hand, if only relative differences between
candidates matter, then rescaling should have no effect on any outcome. Consider the
case in which A has a score of 800, B a score of 750, and C a score of 725. If an admis-
sions committee weights the criterion against others by reference to absolute differences,
then a rescaling in which the scores become 800, 790, and 785 respectively would dilute
the impact of the criterion. Yet if only relative differences were considered, then the gap
between A and B would still be twice as much as the gap between B and C after the
rescaling, and the choice process would be unaffected.
275. See pp. 722-23 supra.
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any two alternatives the relation indicates that one is more desirable than
the other or that the two are equally desirable.276
The second part of axiom 5 states that R "rationalizes" the choice func-
tion, C. This means that for any set of alternatives, v, if x is an alternative
that is in the subset chosen under the choice function, then the relation
xRy will hold for all alternatives y in the set v. "xRy" can be read as
"alternative x is at least as good as alternative y."
The second part of axiom 5 follows from the second part of axiom V
in text and from axioms I and 7.2 77 The second part of axiom V states
that from any two alternatives, the most desirable alternative must be
chosen if one is more desirable than the other. Axiom 5 goes beyond the
case of two alternatives to state that the choice function will select an
alternative that is at least as desirable as all the other possible alernatives.
To see how that axiom follows from axiom 1, axiom 7, and the second
half of axiom V, consider a series of pairwise comparisons of alternatives
using the choice function: the first and second alternative are compared
and the winner is compared to the third alternative, the winner of that
comparison is compared to the fourth alternative, and so on until a final
choice emerges from a comparison involving the last alternative. Axiom
I guarantees that each pairwise comparison will have a single winner, and
axiom 7 implies that the order in which the elements are set up for pair-
wise comparison will not affect the outcome. Suppose alternative F is the
outcome. F could then be designated as the first element in the sequence
for pairwise comparison. F would then be compared sequentially to each
other available alternative. But by the second half of axiom V, F would
have to be at least as desirable as any other available alternative in order
to survive as the winner of such a sequential pairwise comparison with
all the other alternatives.
6. Axiom 6: 3 no i such that Va, b e E, u(a, c1) > u(b, c1) implies that
C((a, b), u) = a where u is the function chosen to scale rankings under
each criterion.
This axiom states that there is no one criterion such that the outcomes
on that criterion determine the choice between any two potential alterna-
tives. The axiom is a technical restatement of axiom VI in text.27 8
n
7. Axiom 7: Vv C E, given n subsets, vi, of v such that U v, = v, then
i=l1
n
C(v, u) = C( U C(vi, u)).
i=1
This axiom states that the outcome of a choice process will not depend
on whether a choice is made from the entire set of alternatives or is made
from a subset of "winners" chosen by applying the choice function to
subsets the union of which is the entire set. The axiom is equivalent to
axiom VII in text.27 9
276. See p. 722 supra (explaining "complete binary relation").
277. See pp. 722-23 supra.
278. See p. 723 supra.
279. See pp. 723-24 supra.
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8. Axiom 8: Vv C E, if a, b e v and if u(a, c1) > u(b, ci) Vi then b o C(v, u).
This axiom states that if a is superior to b under eveiy criterion then
b cannot be chosen when a and b are both alternatives. The axiom is a
technical restatement of axiom VIII in text. 28 0
9. Axiom 9: Va, b e E, Vul eU,ifw,zeEandu eUsuchthatVc EN,
ul(a, c.) = uO(w, c1), and
ul(b, ci) = uO(z, c1)
then if z r C((w, z), u°) then b e C((a, b), ul).
This axiom states that if a has the same categorical rankings as w, and
b has the same categorical rankings as z, then if b is not chosen over a,
z will not be chosen over w. The axiom is equivalent to axiom IX in
text.
2 8 1
Appendix C: Proof of the Inconsistency of the Nine Axioms
Two tasks are performed in this appendix. First, the nine axioms in
Appendix A are used to derive the single condition of Arrow's general
possibility theorem, independence of irrelevant alternatives, that is not
already incorporated in one of the axioms.2 8 2 Lemmas 1 and 2 provide
groundwork for the derivation of independence of irrelevant alternatives
as Lemma 3. The second part of the appendix, Lemmas 4 and 5 and a
final theorem, provides a proof of Arrow's general possibility theorem.
A. Deriving the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
1. Lemma 1: R, the binary relation that rationalizes the choice func-
tion,28 3 is
(i) unique
(ii) total (Vx, y e E, xRy or yRx)2 8 4
(iii) reflexive (Vx e E, xRx)
(iv) transitive (Vx, y, z e E, xRy and yRz := xRz).
Proof:28 5
(i) Uniqueness: Uniqueness follows directly from the single-valuedness
of the choice function postulated in axiom 1.236 For any two potential
280. See pp. 724-25 supra.
281. See p. 725 supra.
282. See pp. 765-68 supra (explaining both independence of irrelevant alternatives
and use of Arrow's general possibility theorem in Appendix C proof that nine axioms
used in text cannot all apply simultaneously to MCCP).
283. See pp. 770-71 supra (axiom 5).
284. R signifies the relation betveen alternatives. xRy can be thought of as "x is at
least as good as y."
285. The bulk of this proof is taken from Plott, Patlh Independence, Rationality and
Social Choice, 41 ECONOMETRICA 1075, 1086 (1973).
286. See pp. 768-69 supra (axiom I). Henceforth in this appendix, no cross-references
will be made to arabic-numbered axioms when the axiom number is stated in the text
of the appendix. All of these axioms are set out in Appendix B, pp. 768-72 supra.
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alternatives, x and y, the choice function must choose one of them if they
are the only two potential alternatives considered. Suppose that x is chosen,
i.e., C(x, y) = x. Then it must be true that xRy and -yRx since otherwise
the choice function would not be single-valued. 2s7 Examining the out-
come of the choice function for each pair of potential alternatives will
define the unique relation, R, between each pair of potential alterna-
tives that rationalizes the choice function.
(ii) Totality: Axiom 3 postulates that the choice function is defined for
all sets of potential alternatives. Axiom 5 requires that the relation R ra-
tionalize the choice function. As a result, it must be that xRy or yRx for
all potential alternatives x and y.
(iii) Reflexivity: Under a relation R of the type "is at least as good as,"
an element is at least as good as itself so that for any potential alterna-
tive x it must be the case that xRx. More formally, axiom 2 requires that
a potential alternative must be chosen if it is the only alternative avail-
able. Thus for any potential alternative x, C(x) = x so that it must be
the case that xRx.
(iv) Transitivity: Consider a set of three potential alternatives {x, y, z} =
v. Suppose x = C{x, y), y = C{y, z). Axiom 7 =- x = C{x, y) = C{C{x},
C(y, z}} = C{C{x, y}, C{z}) = C{x, z}. Axiom 5 => R rationalizes C.
Therefore, we have
(1) xRy, -,yRx, yRz, ~zRy =- xRz, -zRx.
But single-valuedness under axiom 1 =t [Va, b e E, aRb =>. -,bRa].
Therefore (1) reduces to
(2) xRy, yRz = > xRz,
and transitivity is proved.
2. Lemma 2: For every u', u2 e U, Vv C E, if 3 2n numbers a,, ..., a,
,81 > 0, ..., 8, > 0 s.t. Vc e N and Va e E
ul(a, ci) = ai + 83u 2(a, ci) then
C(v, u1 ) = C(v, u 2).
Proof:28 8 Choose arbitrary ul P U; a, ..., a.; 81 > 0, .... /in > 0 and con-
struct u° e U s.t. Vz e E, Vct e N, u°(z, c,) = ai + fliul(z, ci). We must show
C(v, ul) = C(v, uO), Vv C E. Construct u 2 e U s.t. Vz e E and V c e N,
u2(z, ci) = 1 + 8'iul(z, ci) where /3's is defined by:
(i) pick arbitrary 0 < mini.Ejaj 2s 9
(ii) / 1'i - a,_A_ 0_a1 -0
287. See pp. 768-69 supra (choice function must be single-valued); pp. 770-71 supra
(definition of "rationalizes" and requirement that R rationalizes choice function).
288. This proof is taken from D'Aspremont & Gevers, Equity and the Informational
Basis of Collective Choice, 44 Rlv. EcoN. STUD. 199, 205 (1977).
289. The expression minj . x {cl} means the smallest value from the set of all the
numbers ai.
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Now, by axiom 4
(A) C(v, u2) = C(v, ul), Vv C E.
Now write
ul(z, CI) = [u2(z, c)-1] a l- 0"
So uO(z, c1) = ae + fju'(z, c1)
=i+ 3 i C - 1 [u 2(z' cI)-1]
L '01 1
= a, + (a, - 0) [u 2 (z, c1)] + 0 -01
= 0 + (ai - 0) [u2 (z, cI)].
Now, by axiom 4
(B) C(v, u0) = C(v, u2) Vv C E.
Now, putting (A) and (B) together we get C(v, uO) = C(v, ul) Vv C E.
Q.E.D.
3. Definitions:
Definition: for each c, Vuk 8 U, Va, b e E,
aRkIb * uk(a, ci) uk(b, c1).
Definition: aPkib <* aRkib and -bRkia.
4. Lemma 3: Given ui, uk e U, Vv e E s.t. v has at least two elements, if
Va, b e v and Vcj e N it is true that aRkib <:> aRhb then C(v, uk) =
C(v, uJ).
Proof: Pick arbitrary a, b e v, a - b. Assume we have any v e E and any
u', u 2 e U with Vxy e E, xR'fy <> xR 21y, Vc1 e N. We must show
C(v, ul) = C(v, u 2).
We will first show C({a, b}, ul) = C({a, b}, u 2). Assume, without loss
of generality, that aRlb (which => C({a, b), u i) = a). Now we know from
the definition of Rki that u'(a, ci) __ ul(b, c1) <*. u2 (a, ci) _ u2(b, ci) since
aR1ib <:> aR 21b.
Say
.ul(a, cl) = mi
ul(b, c,) = m' 2
u2(a, cI) = n'i
u2(b, c.) = n
774
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Construct u3 by setting290
mi, - nil if nil n12
ai -" __ r' 1 - in12 f =/
mi, - M1 nil if nil n12nil -nt2
1 if nil =n2
91 M rln1 - M 2  if nil n12.
nil 
- n 2
Now define ua(x, ci) = ai + /+,u2(x, c,). By Lemma 2, C(v, u3) = C(v, u 2),
Vv. Specifically, for v = {a, b}, C({a, b}, u3) = C({a, b}, u2). Note, how-
ever, that we can show u3(a, ci) = mi, and u3(b, ci) = mi2:
u3 (a, c,) =
case 1: nil = n12 then u3 (a, c,) = a, + -3,u 2(a, c) =
ri, - nil + nil = mi1.
case 2: ni 1 7 ni. then u3 (a, ci) = a, + piu 2(a, C) =
I, mil - Mnl + mil - m1 2 ni = il.
nil - n. nil 1 - nio
u3(b, ci) =
case 1: nil = ni then u3(b, ci) = a, + 6,u2 (b, c) =
Mi, - nil + n'., m. But nil = ni2  <: Mil = mi2,29
so u3(b, ci) = Mi , = .
case 2: ni # nk. then u3(b, ct) = a, + 8iu2(b, c,) =
i' - il - M 12  + mi - rn 2 n' 2
nil - n12 nil - W2
i i -1 -M n 2 1 i, - (i - 2 ) = min.rol + (n"-. - ni) L r l  -- al- mx- i):mo
Now by axiom 9 and the single-valuedness of the choice function postu-
lated under axiom I, C({a, b}, u3) = C({a, b}, u') since the values of ul
for each of the choice functions are the same for all alternatives and for
all criteria. But we constructed u2 so that by Lemma 2, C({a, b}, u3 ) -
C({a, b), u2). As a result, it must be that C({a, b}, ul) = C({a, b}, u2).
ro', - r'e
290. Note that [m' > m'2 4> n', > n'.] - nil - - > 0 if n', # n'.i- nil
291. By definition, aRkIb * uk(a, c,) >_ uk(b, c). See p. 774 supra. So if n', -




1a. But, by the assumptions of Lemma 3,
xR'1 y * xR-,y for all elements x, y in E. Now [aR-,
2 b and bR2 1a] C [aR1 1 b and
bR1 1 a]. By the definition at the beginning of this note, [aR'ib and bR 1 a] implies that
in', = m'l. since m' = u'(a, c) and m' = ul(h, c,). So we have shown in this note that
n - ' ,
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By axiom 7 any choice over a set V can be decomposed into a series of
choices between pairs of alternatives without affecting the overall choice.
As a result, C({a, b}, ul) = C({a, b}, u2) for any two elements of any sub-
set of E with more than two elements =* C(v, ul) = C(v, u 2) Vv e E with
more than two elements.
Q.E.D.
B. Proof and Application of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem29 2
1. Definitions:
Definition: A set of criteria, C, is almost decisive for x against y if
[xPy Vc s C and yPsx Vc v C] =*' xPy.293
Definition: A set of criteria, C, is decisive for x against y if
[xPIy Vc, 8 C] => xPy.
Definition: D(x, y) means cj is almost decisive for x against y.
Definition: 1 (x, y) means cj is decisive for x against y.
Note that 15(x, y) => D(x, y). Also, C(v, u) can be written C(v; R1, ..., Rn).
2. Lemma 4: If any criterion, cj, is almost decisive for an arbitrary or-
dered pair, x, y, then the choice process violates axiom 6.
Proof: Assume 3x, y e E s.t. D(x, y). By axiom 3 we can pick z a E,
z =# x, z = y, and let i index all criteria, ci, other than the criterion, cj,
that is almost decisive between x and y.
(1) Assume xPjy & yPjz and
yPIx & yPiz.
Note that [D(x, y) & xPjy & yPjx] :=> xPy. Also [yPjz & yPiz] => y =
C({y, z}; R,, ..., R0 ) => yPz, by axiom 8. Next xPy and yPz =*- xPz, from
Lemma 1. By Lemma 3, the independence of irrelevant alternatives, the
choice between x and z, C({x, z}; R 1, R2 , ... R,,) must not be affected by
changes in the rankings under criteria for other pairs of alternatives. Hence,
the assumptions concerning the rankings between x and y and between
y and z under various criteria can be changed without affecting the fact
that x will be chosen over z. The only assumption with respect to the
pair x, z was that xPjz. Thus xPjz := xPz, i.e., D(x, y) =: 15(x, z).
(2) Suppose zPjx & xPjy and
zPjx & yPix.
292. The proofs of Arrow's general possibility theorem are taken from A. S&N, supra
note 3, at 41-46.
293. The relation P means "strictly preferred to." So xPy is equivalent to [xRy and
,',yRx] where R is the relation "is at least as good as."
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Now [zPjx & zPjx] =- zPx. Further [D(x, y) & xPjy & yPix] =* xPy.
Lemma 1 => zPy.
By similar reasoning to (1), zPjy => zPy, so that D(x, y) O (z, y).
(3) By interchanging y and z in (2), we obtain: D(x, z) = (y, z).
(4) In (1) replace z with x, y with z and x with y to obtain: D(y, z) =>
0(y, x).
(4') Using (1), (3), and (4), we get D(x, y) => 15(x, z) => D(x, z) =>f)(y, z) => D(y, z) => 0(y, x).
So
(5) D(x, y) =*> O(y,x)
Note that D(x, y) => D(y, x) as an immediate result. Hence D(y, x) =>
[Ii(y, z) & 15(z, x) & f)(x, y)] by interchanging x and y in (1), (2), and (5).
By combining this with (4') we get
D(y, x) => [1(y, z) 9 O(z, x) , f(x, z) & O(z, y) & 15(x, y) & D(y, x)]
which means cj is decisive for any ordered pair from the set {x, y, z}.
This implies qj is decisive for any a, b e E. To see this, note that, for any
pair a, b e E there are three cases:
case 1: a and b are the same as x and y. Then, by the result above, cj
is decisive for a against b.
case 2: if only one of a and b is the same as x or y, (say a = x without
loss of generality) then take y and form the three element set {a, b, y}. By
the argument above, [5(a, b).
case 3: neither a nor b is the same as x or y. First, form {x, y, a}. We
know D(x, y) => 15(x, a) => f(x, a). Now form {x, a, b}. We know
D(x, a) => 15(a, b) 8: 0(b, a). Hence, given D(x, y) for some arbitrary
x, y = Va, b e E, 15(a, b) (& 15(b, a)). But this means aPjb =,- aPb which
=> a = C({a, b}; R 1, ..., Rn), which violates axiom 6.
Q.E.D.
3. Lemma 5: It must be the case that some criterion, cj, is almost decisive
for some pair, x, y.
Proof: Axiom 8 implies that for any pair of applicants, x and y, the set
of all criteria, {ci} for i = 1, 2, ..., n, is decisive because the axiom estab-
lishes that an alternative that is preferred over another one under every
criterion will be chosen over that other one. From among the set of sets
of criteria that are decisive between some pair (not necessarily the same
pair) choose one of minimal size. Call this set 0 and let it be decisive, and
therefore almost decisive, for x against y. If we can show that there is only
one criterion in 0, then the Lemma is true.
Assume there are two or more categories in 0. Now divide 0 into 61
(containing one criterion from 0) and 02 (containing all the other criteria
in 0). Let 03 be the set of all criteria not in 0.
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By axiom 3, the choice process can operate on alternatives with any set
of rankings under the criteria, i.e., we can choose any ui e U. By axiom 2,
there is at least one potential alternative other than x and y. Call that al-
ternative z and consider the following set of rankings:
(1) Vc1 a 01, xPIy & yPiz
(2) Vcj e 62, zPjx & xPjy
(3) Vck P 03, YPkZ & zPkx.
Since 0 = 01 U 02 is almost decisive for (x, y), xPmy Vcm 8 0 & yPkx 29 4
Vck8 03 = xPy.
Consider the pair of alternatives (y, z). Now zPjy VcJ 6 02 and yPmz Vcm
e 01 U 03. If zPy, then 02 is almost decisive for (y, z). But since 0 was
chosen to be of minimal size and 02 is smaller than 0 by one element,
02 cannot be almost decisive. Therefore by the single-valuedness of the
choice function under axiom 1 and by axiom 5, it must be that yPz.2 05
Now, xPy & yPz => xPz, by transitivity under Lemma 1. However, Vc
e 61, xPjz while VCm C 02 U 03, zPrx. Hence, the single criterion in 01 is
almost decisive for (x, z). However, this is contrary to the assumption that
0 is of minimal size and contains more than one criterion. Therefore 0
has only one criterion in it.
Q.E.D.
4. Theorem: Axioms 1-9 cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
Proof: By combining Lemmas 4 and 5, axiom 6 must be violated.
Note that axioms I-IX in the text imply axioms 1-9 so that the theorem
demonstrates that one of the textual axioms must be violated by any
MCCP.296 Note also that although the theorem is stated here in terms
of axioms 1-9 and not in terms of the conditions for Arrow's general pos-
sibility theorem, the theorem here is essentially Arrow's theorem. The
only difference is that axioms 1-9 were used to obtain as Lemma 3 the
single condition of Arrow's theorem that is not already expressed in one
of the axioms or in the definition of MCCPs.
2 97
Appendix D: List of the Nine Axioms Used in Text
This appendix lists the nine axioms that are used in the text of the
article: 298
1. Axiom I: The MCCP chooses one alternative from a pool of
alternatives.
294. yPkx follows from [YPkz and zPkx] since the preferences under each criterion are
transitive by assumption. See p. 765 supra.
295. See pp. 772-73 and notes 287 & 292 supra.
296. See Appendix B, pp. 768-72 supra (demonstrating that each arabic-numbered
axiom is restatement of or follows from rornan numeral axioms in text).
297. See pp. 765-66, 767-68 supra.
298. For an explanation of the nieaning of the axioms, see pp. 720-25 supra.
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2. Axiom II: There are at least three "potential alternatives," each
of which would be chosen if available and if no better alternative
were a possible choice.
3. Axiom III: The choice process can consider any conceivable
"potential alternative" regardless of its particular characteristics.
4. Axiom IV: The MCCP uses no absolute scales or absolute weights
to combine categorical rankings into a choice.
5. Axiom V: Given any two alternatives A and B, A will be a
more desirable alternative than B, or B will be a more desirable al-
ternative than A, or A and B will be equally desirable alternatives.
The more desirable of the two must be chosen if one is more de-
sirable than the other.
6. Axiom VI: No one criterion totally dominates the MCCP.
7. Axiom VII: For any set of alternatives, the choice process will
have the same result whether the choice is made directly from the
entire set or is made from a set of preliminary winners chosen from
subsets comprising the entire set.
8. Axiom VIII: For every possible set of alternatives, if one mem-
ber of the set ranks higher than a second member in every criterion
used in the choice process, then the second member will not be
chosen.
9. Axiom IX: For any two alternatives, A and B, construct their
comparative categorical rankings. If there are any other two alter-
natives, C and D, where C has the same comparative rankings rela-
tive to D as A has to B, and D is not chosen over C, then B is not
chosen over A.
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